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CIGARETTES AND HEALTH: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
Richard A. Wegmant
In January, 1964, the Surgeon General of the United States declared
cigarette smoking a health hazard of sufficient importance to warrant re-
medial action. In this article, the author considers the legal implications of
the scientific evidence linking cigarette smoking with various major diseases.
He reviews the remedial efforts of Congress and the Federal Trade Com-
mission, as well as the tort suits by lung cancer victims against the tobacco
companies. Mr. Wegman suggests that more comprehensive federal regula-
tion may be necessary in this field.
I will summarily rehearse the hurts that tobacco infereth . . . It
driethe the brain, diminisheth the sight, vitiateth the smell, dulleth
and dejecteth both the appetite and the stomach, destroyeth the decoc-
tion, disturbeth the humours and the spirits, corrupteth the breath,
induceth a trembling of the limbs, exsiccathe the windpipe, lungs and
liver, annoyeth the milt and scorcheth the heart.
Dr. Tobias Venner, Bathe
This indictment, in the year 1650, initiated a controversy between
the medical profession and the proponents of tobacco which in recent
years has developed into an issue of acute national concern. New scien-
tific studies have provided increasing support for the medical thesis that
a causal link exists between cigarette smoking and a number of major
diseases. The Surgeon General's Smoking Report of January 1964 repre-
sents a culmination of these scientific efforts, and has provided an impe-
tus for remedial action in both private and public spheres of law. In the
sphere of private law several lung cancer victims have sought redress
for their injuries by suing cigarette manufacturers in tort. In the public
sphere, both Congress and the Federal Trade Commission have each
taken steps to compel cigarette manufacturers to disclose the health
hazard created by their product.
This article will treat the smoking-health controversy in broad per-
spective, concentrating on the legal and factual bases for each of
these two approaches. As background, Section I will sketch the develop-
ment of the American tobacco industry and its efforts to maintain sales
in the face of oft-repeated health warnings. Section II will summarize
the medical and statistical evidence which serves as justification for
t Attorney, United States Department of justice, Antitrust Division. B.A., Brown
University, 1960; M.S., (Mathematics), New York University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1965. Member, New York Bar. The author is grateful for the invaluable
advice and assistance of his wife, Alice P. Wegman, Member of the New York Bar.
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remedial action. The two principal legal remedies will be examined in
subsequent sections: tort litigation in Section III, and regulation of cig-
arette advertising and labeling in Section IV. The efficacy of these and
other possible solutions will be taken up briefly in the concluding section.
I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM1
Although the tobacco leaf was originally native only to the Americas,
it was in Europe that the consumption of tobacco first became popular.
The early explorers brought tobacco home when they returned from the
New World, and the novelty caught on quickly. Pipe smoking was the
usual form of tobacco consumption until the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, although in fashionable circles the taking of snuff was more popu-
lar. The cigar was introduced in the nineteenth century, and while it
was never very popular in England, it was well received on the European
continent.
In the United States, the popularity of tobacco came much later, with
the development of the modern machine-rolled cigarette around the turn
of the twentieth century providing the necessary impetus. It was the
introduction of the Camel cigarette in 1913, however, that firmly estab-
lished the popularity of cigarettes in this country. Manufactured by
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Camel owed its appeal to a blend
of flavored burley and aromatic Turkish tobaccos. Wide public accept-
ance of cigarettes came with the return of the veterans just after the
First World War, wartime pressures having made cigarettes enormously
popular with soldiers.'
At the same time, the American tobacco industry began one of the
most concerted advertising campaigns ever undertaken in this country.
The primary goal was to convince the general public that cigarette smok-
ing could be socially acceptable, for women as well as for men. An aim
of purely secondary importance was to reassure smokers that no ad-
verse health effects would be encountered. The campaign achieved phe-
nomenal success. Per capita consumption in the United States (for those
over 18 years of age) rose from 138 cigarettes in 1910 to over 1,800 in
1940, reaching a peak of 4,345 in 1963.
1 Much of the historical material for this section comes from two sources: Brecher,
Brecher, Herzog, Goodman & Walker, The Consumers Union Report on Smoking and
the Public Interest 122-48 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Consumers Union Report], and
Nicholls, Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry 35-203 (1951).
2 For an interesting account of the striking growth in popularity achieved by the
"domestic blend" cigarettes, see Nicholls, supra note 1, at 35-44.
3 Newsweek, Jan. 18, 1965.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
As the popularity of cigarettes became established, cigarette adver-
tising changed emphasis and began concentrating almost entirely upon
health. The most blatant of these advertisements appeared during the
1930's. A 1932 Lucky Strike advertisement inquired, "Do You Inhale?"
and reassured rhetorically: "What's there to be afraid of?" Old Gold
followed in rapid order with its familiar slogan: "Not a Cough in a
Carload." Camel introduced its well-known "T-Zone" in 1936, promis-
ing the smoker that both his taste and his throat would react favorably
to Camel's mildness. In addition, the statement that "More Doctors
Smoke Camels" carried implications that Camels were healthier than
other brands. By the 1940's, though, the Federal Trade Commission
began to take action against these solicitations. They were found to be
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce," and therefore viola-
tive of the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 The Commission proceeded
against every major tobacco company at least once during this period.5
In the 1950's the debate ove. the existence of a causal link between
cigarette smoking and lung cancer first received public attention. The
ensuing health scare impelled cigarette advertising to adopt a new
approach. Without mentioning the health scare, advertisers assured
smokers that their brand had gone much farther in reducing the health
risk than had any competing brand. Cue brand asserted it was lowest
in tars, another claimed to be lowest in nicotine; virtually every major
brand participated in this "Tar Derby." The alleged proof for these
claims was usually based on tests whose standards varied according to
the brand being tested; some of these claims were so grossly exaggerated
as to be wholly without justification.' Nevertheless, these advertisements
continued unabated throughout the rest of the decade, and it was not
until 1960 that the FTC was able to persuade the cigarette companies
to call off the "Tar Derby."7
But reassuring advertising alone could not offset the "health scare"
that had begun to sweep the country. Something more was needed, and
filter cigarettes proved to be the answer. Promoting the filter cigarette
4 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
5 See note 247 infra and accompanying text.
6 For example, when Old Gold's claims of lower nicotine were put to the test, it was
found that the actual difference in nicotine content between Old Gold and other brands1
amounted to-1 of an ounce per cigarette. This meant that a pack-a-day smoker would177,187
reduce his consumption of nicotine by less than 1/24 of an ounce over the course of a
year. See P. Lorillard Co., 46 F.T.C. 735, modified, 46 F.T.C. 853, aff'd, 186 F.2d 52 (4th
Cir. 1950).
7 In a compact between the FTC and the leading tobacco firms, the manufacturers
agreed to refrain from all tar and nicotine claims in their advertising. N.Y. Times, Feb.
6, 1960, p. 23, col. 2.
[Vol 51
CIGARETTES AND HEALTH
as a "safer" cigarette enabled the industry to alleviate the fears engen-
dered by the health scare. The campaign succeeded in profoundly altering
the country's smoking habits.8 Since 1952, when filters were intro-
duced on a large scale, more than half of the cigarette smoking popula-
tion-35,000,000-have begun to smoke cigarettes whose principal fea-
tures seem to be that they are "harder to inhale, less aromatic, and yield
less of a kick .... .,, The primary explanation appears to be that filters
give the smoker an opportunity to rationalize his habit.
The unprecedented success of the filter cigarette is indicative of the
alacrity with which the public reacts to potential dangers and its will-
ingness to make concessions to them. Moreover, the mass changeover
to filters demonstrates the remarkable resourcefulness and resiliency of
the tobacco industry, and its ability to allay the public's fears by modify-
ing its product.
Unfortunately, the highly touted health benefits of filter cigarettes
have failed to materialize. To date, there has been no scientific proof
that the filters currently in use are capable of minimizing the health risk.10
The tobaccos used in these cigarettes may often be stronger and more
irritating than those used in their predecessors, with the result that the
smoker inhales almost as much tar and nicotine as he did before. The
blame cannot be placed solely upon the tobacco companies; the public
has simply not been receptive to an effective filter. In 1952, for example,
when Kent first introduced its Micronite filter, only two milligrams of
tar and 0.5 milligrams of nicotine were given off by each cigarette. This
represented an 80% improvement over competing brands. Kent's filter,
however, was too good; puffing a Kent was likened to "smoking through
a mattress." Popular demand forced Kent to loosen up its filter, and the
result was a fourfold increase in nicotine and a sixfold increase in tars.!
Other manufacturers producing "safer" cigarettes were similarly forced
to abandon them.
8 The striking increase in the popularity of filter cigarettes attests to this change. In
1952, just prior to the onset of "he health scare, filter and menthol cigarettes occupied
only 4.2% of the total cigarette market. As studies appeared linking cigarettes with lung
cancer, the sales of filters and mentholated cigarettes increased sharply. By 1965, filters
and mentholated cigarettes occupied 61.3% of the market, an increase of more than 57%
ia a little over 12 years. Federal Trade Commission, Stztement of Basis and Purpose
of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8334-36 (19,.4) [hereinafter cited as State-
ment of FTC Basis]; N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 130, col. 5.
9 Consumers Union Report 128.
10 S Lawyers Medical Cyclopedia 3 38.68, at 666-67 (1960); Whiteside, "A Cloud of
Smoke," The New Yorker, Nov. 30, 1963, p. 74. But see N.Y. Times, May 4, 1965, p.
52, col. I. The Whiteside article also observes that filter cigarettes created a larger profit
margin for the tobacco companies, since premium prices were being charged for the filter
cigarettes, while the filters themselves actually cost less to produce than the tobacco they
displaced.
1 Consumers Union Report 151.
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As the public has reacted ambivalently toward smoking-insisting
on filters for "protection" while demanding that cigarettes still have some
"kick" to them-the medical evidence has mounted steadily, each year
becoming more and more convincing in its indictment of cigarettes as a
serious health hazard. The promotion of filter cigarettes was designed
to cnunteract this accumulating medical evidence, but the warnings gradu-
ally became so strong that they could no longer be minimized. The fol-
lowing statements reflect the growing belief in the strength of the medi-
cal position over the past ten years.
October 22, 1954:
[PIresently available evidence indicates an association between smok-
ing, particularly cigarette smoking, and lung cancer, and to a lesser degree
other forms of cancer.
July, 1957:
[T~he weight of the evideme is increasingly pointing in one direction:
that excessive smoking is one of the causative factors in lung canceri s
November 20, 1959:
[The evidence indicates] that cigarette smoking is a major causative factor
in the increasing incidence of human carcinoma of the lung.j4
January 21, 1960:
[T1he clinical, epidemiological, experimental, chemical and pathologic
evidence . . . indicates beyond reasonable doubt that cigarette smokingis the major cause of the unprecedented increase in lung cancer.' 5
February 27, 1960:
[Cligarette smoking is a major cause of lung cancer .... No present
method of treating tobacco or filtering the smoke has been proved to
reduce the harmful effects of cigarette smoking.'
March 7, 1962:
Cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer and bronchitis, and probably
contributes to the development of coronary heart disease and various
other less common diseases.17
The tobacco industry has not allowed these statements to go unchal-
lenged. In 1953, when the public first began to take seriously the warn-
12 Resolution adopted by the American Cancer Society, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 19S4,
p. 17, col. 1.
13 Dr. Leroy Burney, Surgeon General of the U.S. P.blc Health Service, Statement of
FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8328.
14 Report of a World Health Organization Study Group on the Epidemiology of
Cancer of the Lung, Consumers Union Report 64.
15 Statement by the American Cancer Society, Consumers Union Report 6S.16 National Tuberculosis Association, Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8328.
17 Royal College of Physicians of London, Smoking and Health S7 (1962).
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ings about tobacco and health, the tobacco companies undertook to com-
bat the warning signals with statements of their own. To do so in unison,
five of the six major cigarette manufacturers formed the Tobacco In-
dustry Research Committee (TIRC), which since that time has acted as
a spokesnan for the industry on public health matters. 8 The Commit-
tee announced its purposes on January 5, 1954, in a full page newspaper
advertisement entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers."
TIRC questioned the recent findings of research scientists and pledged
that it would sponsor impartial scientific studies concerning tobacco.
It promised to "let the results speak for themselves .. . 21"'
As data accumulated, however, TIRC could not remain impartial. In-
stead, the Committee acted to counter the medical pronouncements by
issuing statements challenging their validity. As of 1954, according to
TIRC's principal spokesman, Timothy Hartnett, "nobody ha[d] pro-
duced evidence proving that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer2
The following year, Mr. Hartnett labeled the results of a doctors' sur-
vey as "biased" and "nonscientific2'2' When the Surgeon General im-
plicated smoking in a 1958 statement, smokers were told by the TIRC
that this "adds nothing new."= A year later, in response to the con-
tinued efforts of the American Cancer Society to warn the public of the
health hazards involved, Mr. Hartnett suggested that their campaign
might be ra one-sided propaganda effort.2 3 This position was reiterated
in 1963, with TIRC still maintaining that "oin our present state of knowl-
edge, no one knows the answers."'
Regardless of the merit of the TIRC position, the effect of these pro-
nouncements cannot be disregardmL Newspapers, fearful of offending
cigarette advertisers, have given full coverage to the industry's state-
ments. Undoubtedly, "TIRC's constant statements that the findings are
not conclusive have kept the speculation alive, and there is little doubt
that the steady smoker can find, in this conflict, the justification not to
stop. 2
The modem era in this field was ushered in by the Surgeon General's
Smoking Report, published on January 11, 1964. The crux of the Report
is For the material on TIRC, see Whiteside, supra note 10, at 68; Consumers Union
Report 107-13.
19 Consumers Union Report 107.
2o Id. at 109.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 109-10.
23 Id. at ii0.
24 In recent years, much of TIRC's function has been taken over by the Tobacco
Institute.
25 Consumers Union Report 113.
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was an indictment of cigarette smoking and a call for remedial action:
Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance
in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action. 6
The Report has acted as a spur to governmental action on two fronts.
Congress has enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, requiring all cigarette packages to bear a warning label, and the
Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a trade regulation rule com-
pelling manufacturers, in all cigarette advertising and labeling, to dis-
close the health hazard of cigarettes. Both of these actions are designed
to put controls on the promotion and sale of cigarettes. The FTC rule,
however, is presently under a four year moratorium imposed by Congress,
and is not scheduled to go into effect until 1969.
It must be recognized that the cigarette promotional methods which
gave rise to these new strictures have undergone a considerable change
in form from those of former years. Modern cigarette advertising has
turned away from direct references to the physiological effects of smok-
ing, emphasizing instead the smoker's psychogenic needs. 7 Satisfaction,
refreshing flavor, and taste are touted, usually in the form of a slogan-
e.g., "Parliament lets you enjoy true, rich tobacco flavor," or "Pall Mall
travels pleasure to you." Cigarettes are frequently linked with scenes
depicting romance and the outdoors--"couples cavorting in menthol
mists," as one observer described it.28
Attempts to allay smokers' fears still exist, of course, but are far more
subtle than in the days of the "Tar Derby." Modem advertisements gen-
erally concentrate on the physical attributes of the filter itself. Thus,
Winston's "pure white modern filter," Viceroy's "deep-weave filter," and
Lark's filter with charcoal granules are all prominent today. These ad-
vertisements, while scrupulously avoiding any specific mention of health
benefits, may well be designed to convey the impression that technologi-
cal advances have made for a healthier cigarette.
To date, the industry's efforts to maintain the level of cigarette smok-
26 US. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking & Health: Report of
Advisory Comm. to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service 33 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Smoking Report].
2A set of cigarette advertising guides, issued by the Federal Trade Commission on
September 22, 1955, when the health scare was at its height, has had some Influence
in bringing about this shift in emphasis. The guides were aimed primarily at craits
which referred to any physical effect to be derived from smoking. The guides were also
designed to elimxnat all representations as to nicotine and tar content, unless supported
by "competent scientific proof."
In addition to the FTC guides, promotional copy today is governed by the Cigarette
Advertising Code, which went into effect on January 1, 1966. The Code is an industry
attempt at self-regulation, adopted in the hope of averting more stringent governmental
measures. See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
28 N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1964, 1 3, p. 12, col. 3, coL S.
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ing have unquestionably been successful. Some 70 million people in the
United States today are regular smokers,29 with the average smoker con-
suming approximately a pack of cigarettes a day." Despite this success,
the industry is not sitting still. To cushion any possible decline in cig-
arette popularity, the companies have been diversifying their products
and branching into other enterprises. R. J. Reynolds has been the most
farsighted. Shortly after the 1953 scare developed, it entered the alumi-
num products field, and subsequently also acquired a fruit juice com-
pany. Reynolds' most recent acquisition is Penick & Ford, Ltd., makers
of My-T-Fine desserts and Vermont Maid syrup.
The other tobacco companies have followed suit. P. Lorillard has en-
tered the tire and cat food industries, U. S. Tobacco makes candy, Lig-
gett & Myers has acquired the Allen Products Co., producers of Alpo
dog food, and Philip Morris has become involved in razor blades, chew-
ing gum, adhesive, and chemicals.81 American is the last of the major
companies to attempt diversification. On February 3, 1965, American
announced that it would acquire all of the stock of Consolidated Foods,
a transaction which would have constituted one of the largest corporate
mergers. 2 The plan was thwarted, however, when the FTC failed to
approve the merger. 3
Thus, in the relatively short period of a little over ten years, the rum-
blings of a violent upheaval have begun to shake the tobacco industry.
The country's smoking habits, if not the volume, have undergone a dras-
tic change. Cigarette advertising has been carefully scrutinized and
thoroughly revised. Medical and scientific pronouncements have grown
ever more convincing. The federal government has been moved to take
remedial action. But the industry's dilemma has perhaps been made most
vivid by the decision of the tobacco companies to gradually diversify
their interests. If this is interpreted as a hedge against future losses now
regarded by the industry as inevitable, then this fact alone, even absent
the other manifestations, suggests that the cigarette interests may not
be able to fend off the medical onslaught indefinitely.
II
A SuMMARY oF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE
By 1961 a number of groups-the American Cancer Society, the
American Public Health Association, the American Heart Association,
29 Smoking Report 45.
30 Consumers Union Report 106.
31 Time, June 28, 1963, p. 73; Business Week, Dec. 11, 1965, p. 68.
32 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1965, p. 41, col. 1.
33 Business Week, Dec. 11, 1965, p. 68.
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and the National Tuberculosis Association among them-had become in-
creasingly concerned about the health hazard of smoking and, in par-
ticular, about the indifference of the American public to the danger
signals.3 4 They requested President Kennedy to appoint a commission
to study the problem. In their request, they were supported by Surgeon
General Luther L. Terry, who felt that significant developments of the
early 1960's justified a comprehensive reassessment of the smoking-
health controversy.35 These suggestions were heeded, and on June 7, 1962,
the President and the Surgeon General jointly announced the establish-
ment of the advisory committee. 8
It was agreed that the job should be completed in two phases. Phase
I was to be "an objective assessment of the nature and magnitude of the
health hazard .... ,"' The committee was not formed for the purpose
of conducting new experiments or financing research programs38 Rather,
its function was limited to a critical review of the accumulated data,
and the formulation of conclusions from this data.3 9
Phase II was to encompass specific recommendations for action. This
was not considered to be part of the advisory committee's responsibility,
and no decisions on Phase II were to be made until after the completion
of Phase I and the issuance of the committee's report.4
The task took nearly 18 months. As the time for release of the report
approached, both the tobacco industry and the general public grew ap-
prehensive.41 It was feared that the causal link between cigarettes and
lung cancer (and possibly other diseases) might at last be conclusively
established. Finally, on January 11, 1964, the Smoking Report was
published. The report pulled no punches. The conclusions were every
34 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964, p. 65, col. 8.
35 Smoking Report 7. Among the developments cited by Dr. Terry were: (1) several
new studies, in particular one by the Royal College of Physicians of London, indicating
major adverse health effects created by smoking; (2) concrete action taken by the
British, Danish, and Italian governments to curtail cigarette advertising; (3) a request
from the FTC for guidance in regulating the labeling and advertising of tobacco products;
and (4) an ever-increasing consensus among physicians as to the health hazards of
smoking. Id. at 8.
386 Id. at 7-8.
87 Id. at 8.
38 Id. at 13.
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 8.
41 With characteristic secrecy, the Government guarded the pending smoking report as
if it were a highly confidential military matter. Formal meetings of the committee took
place in a windowless underground chamber, and special keys were necessary to operate
elevators leading to the meeting room. Committee materials were locked in subterranean
vaults. The combination to open these vaults was not entrusted to any single member
of the committee. Security precautions taken at top military or diplomatic conferences
could hardly be more restrictive than those employed here. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964,
p. 65, col. 8.
[Vol. 51
. CIGARETTES AND HEALTH
bit as forceful as had been feared,42 and the finding with respect to lung
cancer was particularly striking:
Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men; the mag-
nitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs all other factors. 43
The data for women, though less extensive, point in the same direction.44
The risk of developing lung cancer increases with duration of smoking
and the number of cigarettes smoked per day, and is diminished by
discontinuing smoking.45
The committee also adopted formal conclusions on the relation between
cigarette smoking and other diseases.46 In determining the weight to be
42 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
43 At no time does the Report assert that cigarette smoking is the sole cause of lung
cancer. The fact that approximately 10% of the lung cancer cases occur in nonsmokers
indicates that other causal factors do exist. In particular, two other factors were noted
by the committee.
(a) Air pollution: Atmospheric pollution, urbanization, and industrialization are all
causes of respiratory irritation, but to a much lesser degree than cigarette smoke. The
explanation lies in the type of exposure. For nearly all smokers, the consumption of
cigarettes takes place consistently and periodically throughout the day, every day of the
year. Air pollution, on the other hand, varies considerably in concentration from season
to season, even in the most densely populated urban and industrial centers. Id. at 296.
(b) Occupational hazards: An excess of lung cancer mortality has been observed
among chromium and nickel workers, and among uranium miners. Smaller but significant
excesses were found among coal gas and asbestos workers. The presence of arsenic as a
common element in many of these ores has been suggested as a possible causal factor.
But these occupational hazards are relevant for only a very small minority of the popula-
tion, and do not account for the tremendous increase in lung cancer mortality for the
population at large. Id. at 193-94.
44The report was based on data drawn primarily from studies dealing with male
subjects. The data for females, though drawn from smaller samples, tended to corroborate
the results. Although female mortality was found to be below that for males, the report
attributed the discrepancy to the difference between male and female smoking patterns,
not to a biological difference between the sexes. It noted that there is an increasing
percentage of nonsmoking females at the higher ages, that females consistently begin
smoking later in life, and that males at all ages smoke considerably more cigarettes per
day than do females. Id. at 177-78.
45 Id. at 37.
46 Cancers Other than Lung Cancer:
Evaluation of the evidence leads to the judgment that cigarette smoking is a
significant factor in the causation of laryngeal cancer in the male ....
The evidence on the tobacco-esophageal cancer relationship supports the belief
that an association exists. However, the data are not adequate to decide whether the
relationship is causal . ...
Available data suggest an association between cigarette smoking and urinary bladder
cancer in the male but are not sufficient to support a judgment on the causal sig-
nificance of the association . . ..
No relationship has been established between tobacco use and stomach cancer . . ..
Chronic Bronchitis and Pulmonary Emphysema:
Cigarette smoking is the most important of the causes of chronic bronchitis in the
United States, and increases the risk of dying from chronic bronchitis.
A relationship exists between pulmonary emphysema and cigarette smoking but it
has not been established that the relationship is causal.
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accorded these conclusions, the committee's conception of the term
"cause" is crucial. Recognizing this, the committee took care to describe
in detail the factors which had to be present before it would conclude
that a causal association existed. It emphasized that wherever the word
"cause") was employed in the report, it should be accorded full weight.
[N] o member of this Committee used the word "cause" in an absolute
sense in the area of this study .... All were thoroughly aware of the fact
that there are series of events in occurrences and developments in these
fields, and that the end results are the net effect of many actions and
counteractions.
Granted that these complexities were recognized, it is to be noted
clearly that the Committee's considered decision to use the words "a-
cause," or "a major cause," or "a significant cause," or "a causal associa-
tion" in certain conclusions about smoking and health affirms their con-
viction.47
Elaborating further, the committee stated that "cause," as used in the
report, was meant to convey "the notion of a significant, effectual rela-
tionship between an agent and an associated disorder or disease in the
host."4 Thus, despite the fact that "cause" was not employed in an
absolute sense, the concept of causation as used throughout the Smoking
Report clearly has legal significance.
The studies which comprise the Surgeon General's Smoking Report
lie at the very heart of the cigarette controversy, for it is on their validity
that the justification for all types of remedial action rests. Hence, the
remainder of this section will present a brief summary of the factual
and statistical content of the report.
For the bulk of the population of the United States, the importance of cigarette
smoking as a cause of chronic bronchopulmonary disease is much greater than that
of atmospheric pollution or occupational exposures.
Cardiovascular Disease:
Male cigarette smokers have a higher death rate from coronary artery disease than
nonsmoking males, but it is not clear that the association has causal significance.
Other Conditions:
Epidenmiological studies. indicate an association between cigarette smoking and
peptic ulcer which is greater for gastric than for duodenal ulcer ....
Increased mortality of smokers from cirrhosis of the liver has been shown in the
prospective studies. The data are not sufficient to support a direct or causal association.
Women who smoke cigarettes during pregnancy tend to have babies of lower birth
weight.
Smoking Report 37-39.
47 Id. at 21.
48 Ibid.
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A. Population Studies
The Surgeon General's Report is based on data drawn primarily from
epidemiological studies. These are broadly based population studies, gen-
erally of two types. In the first type, which are retrospective in nature,
a group of individuals with a specific disease (e.g., lung cancer) and a
control group of individuals without the disease are chosen at random,
and their smoking histories are compared. Whenever the healthy con-
trol group is found to contain fewer smokers than the afflicted group, and
the difference is large enough to be statistically significant, then an in-
ference may be validly drawn that some relation between smoking and
the particular disease exists.
The second category of epidemiological studies are prospective. A ran-
domly chosen group of normal individuals are classified according to,
their smoking habits, and are then observed for a fixed period of time,
with the aim of observing correlations between smoking and any dis-
eases the subjects may develop.
Seven prospective studies involving a total of 1,123,000 men were
subjected to careful scrutiny. These studies revealed that the death rate
for all smokers49 (based on all causes of death) is 68% higher than for
nonsmokers (mortality ratio = 1.68). Moreover, the studies revealed still
higher mortality rates for a number of major diseases, including several
types of cancer, bronchitis and various circulatory ailments. 50 Within
these generalizations, a number of variables were found to have a sig-
nificant effect on mortality. Of most serious consequence were: (1) type
of tobacco consumed (cigarettes vs. cigars or pipes); (2) daily rate of
consumption; (3) age at which smoking began and terminated; (4) de-
gree of inhalation; (5) and butt length. Each will be considered below.
49 "Death, rate" and "mortality ratio" as used in the report are terms with definite
mathematical and statistical meaning. For a discussion illustrating the statistical significance
and potential faults of the terms, see Smoking Report 84.
50 The combined results for specific diseases are as follows:
Mortality ratio for smokers
Cause of Death of cigarettes (normal = 1.0)
Lung cancer 10.80
Bronchitis and emphysema 6.10
Cancer of larynx 5.40
Oral cancer 4.10
Cancer of esophagus 3.40
Ulcers 2.80
Other circulatory diseases 2.60
Cirrhosis of liver 2.20
Cancer of bladder 1.90
Coronary artery disease 1.70
Other heart diseases 1.70
All causes of death 1.68
Id. at 102.
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(1) Type of Tobacco Consumed. The type of tobacco consumed had a
considerable effect on overall mortality. The mortality rate for cigar and
pipe smokers was found to be far below that observed in cigarette
smokers, 1 and only slightly higher than that for nonsmokers.52 This
difference is largely attributable to the fact that cigar and pipe smokers
rarely inhale, while it is the unusual cigarette smoker who does not in-
hale at all. Studies have established a high correlation between the de-
gree of inhalation and adverse health consequences.
(2) Daily Rate of Consumption. Individual variations in the daily
rate of consumption of cigarettes also produced very substantial fluctua-
tions in mortality rates. A smoker who consumes fewer than 10 cigarettes
per day has a death rate (from all causes) 40 per cent higher than a
nonsmoker. But an individual who smokes in excess of two packs a day
has a death rate that is 120 per cent higher than the nonsmoker's death
rate. When the specific disease of lung cancer is considered separately,
the figures are even more striking. Moderate smokers (less than 10 cig-
arettes a day) were found to be seven times as prone to lung cancer as
nonsmokers, while the heaviest smokers (over two packs a day) are
more than 20 times as likely to contract the disease.5
Perhaps the most significant aspect of these figures is that even the
moderate smoker incurs a risk that is substantially above that for the
nonsmoking population. This serves to dispel any suggestion that it is
only the overindulgent who are subjected to a health hazard. It is this,
51 Because cigarettes are not only the most deleterious but are also the most popular
form of tobacco consumption, our focus, and that of the Smoking Report, is on cigarette
smoking and the hazards which it creates.
52 The risk of contracting certain specified diseases, though, is subject to more than a
two-fold increase for cigar and pipe smokers:
Cause of Death Mortality Ratio (normal = 1.0)
Oral cancer 3.40
Cancer of esophagus 3.20
Cancer of larynx 2.80
Lung cancer 1.70
Cirrhosis of liver 1.60
Ulcers 1.60
Cancer of kidney 120
Cancer of intestines 1.30
Other circulatory diseases 1.20
All causes of death 1.06
Id. at 107.
53 The complete chart is as follows:
Mortality Ratios
Cigarettes smoked per day (all causes) (lung cancer)
Less than 10 1.40 7.44
10-19 1.70 8.42
20-39 1.90 17.91
40 or more 2.20 20.64
Id. at 29; Consumers Union Report 36.
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possibly more than any other factor, that makes cigarette smoking such
an insidious menace to health.
(3) Duration of Habit. The duration of the smoking habit was found
to have a significant effect upon mortality rates. Individuals who took
up the habit at an early age, and who continued smoking late in life,
had mortality rates as high as double those for smokers with shorter
smoking spans. 4 It was also found that ex-smokers generally had con-
siderably lower mortality rates than current cigarette smokers. In the
five prospective studies Where this comparison was made, the ex-smokers
consistently had 30 per cent lower mortality than current smokers, al-
though their rates were higher than rates for those who never smoked.5
(4) Degree of Inhalation. Inhalation was found to have a very marked
effect upon the mortality figures, as one would expect. For example,
moderate to deep inhalers who smoked an average of only 1-9 cigarettes
per day actually had a higher mortality than people who smoked an
average of 20-39 cigarettes daily but did not inhale.56
Laboratory experiments with animals suggest the reason why the de-
gree of inhalation is so significant. Through the use of radioactive ele-
ments, it has been possible to trace the various particles contained in
cigarette smoke as they permeate the respiratory tracts of laboratory
animals, and it has been found that substantial amounts are deposited
permanently in the deepest passages of the tracheobronchial tree. 7
The results of studies with live human subjects point in the same direc-
tion. Despite the large amount of smoke that appears to leave the smoker's
lungs when he exhales, a very large percentage of the smoke constituents
in each puff are retained in the smoker's system after exhalation. When
the smoke is inhaled and held in the lungs for a relatively short period
of two to five seconds, the smoker's system retains approximately 80-90
per cent of the particles in the cigarette smoke. If the puff is deliberately
held for a considerably longer period (up to 30 seconds), his system
retains nearly 100 per cent of the particles he has inhaled."
(5) Butt Length. Can also affect mortality to a marked degree.
54 Where smoking was begun prior to age 20, the mortality for smokers was at least
98% higher than for nonsmokers. However, where the smoking habit was not started
until after age 25, a maximum ratio differential of only 399 was observed. Similarly, it
was found that stopping smoking after the age of 55 contributed to a higher death rate
than if smoking ceased at an earlier age. Smoking Report 89, 93.
55 The differential between ex-smokers and current smokers actually may be well in
excess of 30%, because any group of ex-smokers is likely to include a number of people
who quit smoking because of some physical ailment (not caused by smoking), whose
mortality would therefore be somewhat higher to begin with.
58 Smoking Report 91.
57 Id. at 265.
58 Id. at 264.
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This is because the unconsumed portion of each cigarette acts as
a natural filter, trapping many of the toxic substances that would
otherwise reach the smoker's mouth. As the cigarette gets progressively
shorter, not only does the tobacco provide less filtration, but each puff
also contains a portion of the trapped substances from earlier puffs. Thus,
the smoker who consumes one cigarette to its very end exposes himself
to more toxic elements than the smoker who consumes two cigarettes
but extinguishes each at the half-way mark.
It has been observed, for example, that British smokers have a sig-
nificantly higher incidence of lung cancer than their American counter-
parts. Variations in their smoking patterns account for this, since Ameri-
can smokers generally waste more of each cigarette than the more eco-
nomical Englishmen. This is confirmed by a recent study which found that
the average length of an American cigarette butt was 30.9 millimeters,
compared with 18.7 millimeters for the British discard.59 The affluent
American smoker, by discarding his half-finished cigarette, is uncon-
sciously reducing the health hazard to which he subjects himself.
When the statistical results for all these variants are taken into con-
sideration, they lead to one conclusion: mortality rates from all causes,
and particularly the lung cancer mortality rates, increase in direct pro-
portion to any increase in exposure to cigarette smoke. The committee's
logic seems unimpeachable:
If cigarette smoking is an important factor in lung cancer, then the risk
should be related to the amount smoked, amount inhaled, duration of
smoking, age when started smoking, discontinuance of smoking, time since
discontinuance, and amount smoked prior to discontinuance. Herein lies
the greatest coherence with the known facts of the disease. In almost every
study for which data were adequate and which was directed -to amount of
smoking, duration of smoking and age when smoking was begun, the
associations or calculated relative risks (direct or indirect) revealed
gradients in the direction of supporting a true dose effect.60
B. Laboratory Studies
Numerous laboratory experiments have been conducted over the past
15-20 years to determine exactly how substances contained in cigarette
smoke affect the human body. While the inquiries have been directed
toward a wide variety of ailments, the three categories of diseases which
have received particular attention are (1) cancer (primarily lung cancer),
(2) cardiovascular diseases, and (3) chronic bronchitis.
(1) Cancer (Primarily Lung Cancer). A series of aromatic hydro-
carbons which are present in cigarette smoke have been isolated in
59 Id. at 177.
60 Id. at 187-88.
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laboratory tests and shown to have carcinogenic (cancer-producing)
properties.61 The aromatic hydrocarbon which is most prevalent in the
smoke 2 is a compound called benzo(a)pyrene, which has been proven
one of the most potent of all carcinogens now known.63 Moreover, when
certain other compounds also present in cigarette smoke were added
to benzo(a)pyrene, the carcinogenic potency of the whole was found to
be vastly increased.
6 4
Having shown that these carcinogenic compounds are present in cig-
arette smoke, the next step in the scientific inquiry has been the de-
velopment of a causal hypothesis to explain the process by which cig-
arette smoking is capable of breaking down normal lung functioning.
The theory which has been advanced is that cigarette smoke paralyzes
the cilia that line lung passages, thereby depriving the lungs of an im-
portant protective mechanism. This permits the smoke to come in con-
tact with the surface lining (epithelium) of the respiratory tract. The
chronic irritation which ensues would be quite capable of producing
hyperplasia, the first stage in the development of cancer. 5 Once this
has taken place, further smoking gives the carcinogens in cigarette smoke
an opportunity to induce an alteration in the cell nucleus, thereby initiat-
ing metaplasia.66 At this point, cancer has a foothold. Unless halted
through prompt medical care, usually surgery, invasive cancer is the
inevitable tragic consequence.67
The results of a recent study financed by the American Cancer Society
61 Carcinogenicity is tested by brushing the backs of young mice with a dilute solution
of tar in an organic solvent. The tests are begun when the mice are six weeks old, and
are repeated three times a week for a year or more. During this time, the mice are
kept under constant surveillance to detect the outbreak of cancerous lesions. Id. at 58.
62 Ironically, most of these carcinogenic substances are not present in the native
tobacco leaf. Rather, they are formed by pyrolytic process (chemical decomposition) as
the tobacco and cellulose bum together at temperatures in the neighborhood of 8500 C.
Id. at 59.
63 Id. at 55.
04 Id. at 58-59.
65 Hyperplasia involves an increase in the number of cells in a particular tissue (and a
consequent increase in the size of the tissue), resulting from a division of cells at a faster
rate. It can be caused by any sort of chronic irritation anywhere in the body. The subse-
quent stages in the conversion from normal cells to cancerous cells are metaplasia and
metastasis, discussed, notes 66-67 infra.
66 In this stage, an alteration in the cell itself occurs, most probably in the DNA
chromosomes contained in the cell nucleus. When these metaplastic cells divide, they give
rise to further cells of the same character. Eventually a lesion will develop, consisting
solely of metaplastic cells. Initially, the cells contained in such a lesion will continue to
live within their own boundaries, and will not invade the neighboring tissue. At this
stage, the lesion is known as a cancer in situ, and if diagnosed and removed at this stage,
the cancer will not recur. Consumers Union Report 40-44.
67 At this final stage, metastasis, the cells from the original lesion break away and are
carried by the blood stream to be deposited in other parts of the body, where new cancers
will then develop. Alternatively, the cells from the original lesion may simply break
through their boundaries and invade neighboring tissues. If either or both of these
processes take place, the disease is generally fatal to the host. Ibid.
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have provided a great deal of support for this theory.68 Through the
microscopic study of human lungs at autopsy, it was established that
the incidence of hyperplasia, metaplasia, and cells with atypical nuclei
was very much higher in the lungs of those who had been cigarette
smokers than in the lungs of those who had not smoked. 9 In addition,
carcinoma in situ was found only in the lungs of individuals who had
been smokers. Perhaps even more significant, the number of tissue sam-
ples that exhibited these various pre-cancerous and cancerous condi-
tions increased in proportion to the amount of smoking done by the
individual.
The Auerbach group made another finding that should be of even
greater interest to current cigarette smokers: that these pre-cancerous
conditions can be reversed by the cessation of smoking, as long as the
lesions have not reached the invasive stage and metastasized. The Auer-
bach group encountered a rare type of "disintegrating cell" with a con-
tracted nucleus, which was present only in the lungs of ex-smokers and
was totally non-existent in the lungs of either the smokers or nonsmokers.
Auerbach inferred that these disintegrating cells had previously reached
a pre-cancerous state (through hyperplasia and metaplasia) and, due to
the cessation of smoking by the ex-smoker, were dying out instead of
multiplying. The group concluded:
We believe that -the findings of an increase in the number of cells with
atypical nuclei following exposure to cigarette smoke, and a decrease in
such cells with cessation of smoking, provide a reasonable explanation
for the epidemiological findings [that a causal link exists between cigarette
smoking and lung cancer].
Persons who have smoked cigarettes for many years sometime express
the opinion that the harm has already been done and that they might as
well continue to smoke since it will do them no more harm. The evidence
is completely contrary to that point of view .... Cigarette smokers who
give up the habit thereby reduce their risk of acquiring lung cancer.70
(2) Cardiovascular Diseases.7' In addition to their study of lung tis-
68 Auerbach, Stout, Hammond & Garfinkel, Bronchial Epithelium in Former Smokers,
New Eng. J. Med., July 19, 1962, p. 119.
69 Lung tissues of three categories of individuals-smokers, nonsmokers and ex-smokers-
were examined by the Auerbach group. The percentages of lung tissue slides containing
metaplastic cells were as follows: 1.2% in nonsmokers; 6.0% in ex-smokers; and 93.2%
in current smokers. Id. at 120.
70 Id. at 124.
'71 The 1.7 mortality ratio for heart disease, although relatively low, takes on far
greater significance when it is considered that cardiovascular diseases claim more than
700,000 lives in the United States each year. Hence the 1.7 mortality ratio represents be-
tween 32.9% and 51.7% of all the excess deaths attributable to smoking. In contrast,
deaths from lung cancer annually number approximately 39,000, and the much higher
10.8 mortality ratio accounts for only 13.5% to 24.0% of the total excess deaths. Smoking
Report 317. Thus, any link between smoking and cardiovascular disease is cause for
concern, even though the report does not formally denominate the relationship as causal.
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sues for pre-cancerous cellular changes, the Auerbach group also inves-
tigated the extent to which cigarette smoking impairs the capacity of
the lungs to function efficiently.72 The investigations revealed four spe-
cific conditions that were far more prevalent in the lungs of smokers:
(a) thickening of the walls of small arteries, thus lessening the amount
of blood that can flow through at a given speed; (b) thickening of the
walls of the tiny arterioles; (c) thickening of the walls of the air sacs
in the bronchial tubes, thus impeding the blood from picking up oxygen
and depositing carbon dioxide; (d) rupturing of the membranes which
separate the bronchial air sacs, thus depriving the sacs of their air-
containing ability."
These four conditions impose a substantial burden on the heart, by
forcing it to supply more blood to the lungs in order to meet the body's
oxygen needs. They reduce the efficiency of the "heart-lung machine"
and, depending upon their severity, would be capable of seriously im-
pairing heart functioning. Given these findings, the observed statistical
association between cigarette smoking and heart disease is not surprising.
These observations alone, however, are not enough to justify a con-
clusion that cigarette smoking is a cause of heart disease. The existence
of a third factor-a coronary-prone personality-may serve equally well
to explain these observations. Such an individual is depicted as "the ag-
gressive, competitive person who takes on too many jobs, fights dead-
lines, and is obsessed by the lack of adequate time for the performance
of 'his work . . . 27" Frequently, these people are also heavy smokers.
In such people, cigarette smoking and heart disease may both be effects
of the same causal factor: a coronary-prone personality.
(3) Chronic Bronchitis. The Report's conclusions concerning chronic
bronchitis75 are well supported by the laboratory findings. A number
of morphological changes that are commonly associated with this dis-
ease have been observed in the respiratory tracts of cigarette smokers.
Such conditions have generally not been found in nonsmokers. Hyper-
plasia of the tissue cells was usually present. The surface epithelium
evidenced metaplasia in varying degrees. The goblet cells and mucous
glands, which aid in cleansing the lung, were substantially affected. The
goblet cells in particular had considerable distortion.7
72 Consumers Union Report 73-78.
78 Ibid.
74 Smoking Report 321.
75 See note 46 supra.
76 Smoking Report 271.
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Prevalence studies point in the same direction. These have shown that
the usual symptoms associated with chronic bronchitis-chronic cough,
sputum, and breathlessness-occur with much greater frequency in
smokers than in nonsmokers. 7 When taken together with the laboratory
analyses, this evidence provides a strong basis for the Report's conclu-
sion that "cigarette smoking is the most important of the causes of
chronic bronchitis in the United States .... 2
In conclusion, the Smoking Report provides an excellent survey of the
evidence bearing on the relationship between cigarette smoking and vari-
ous diseases. In light of this evidence, the findings of the Advisory Com-
mittee seem entirely justified. Moreover, these findings are enhanced
by the committee's scrupulous avoidance of dogmatism. Witness the de-
tail in which it spelled out its concept of the word "cause,"7 9 the attention
given to other possible causal factors in the development of lung cancer,80
and the suggestion that an altogether extraneous factor may be respon-
sible for the observed association between cigarette smoking and heart
disease. 8'
The continued smoking of cigarettes on a large scale poses a serious
health hazard to the American public. Efforts of medical and scientific
groups to discourage smoking have proved to be of no avail. Remedial
action, predicated on the conclusions of the Smoking Report, has be-
come inevitable.
III
TORT LITIGATION
The cigarette smoker who contracts lung cancer as a result of a long
history of tobacco consumption has but one potential legal remedy:
to sue the cigarette manufacturer in tort, usually on the theory that the
manufacturer has acted in breach of his undertaking to supply a product
of merchantable quality. As of the present writing, four cigarette-cancer
cases have been fully litigated, at both the trial and appellate levels.
The facts in all four cases are remarkably similar: plaintiff, a confirmed
smoker for many years, developed lung (or laryngeal) cancer; subse-
quently he (or his family) instituted suit against the cigarette manufac-
turer to recover for his injuries; and, most significant, in each instance
plaintiff became apprised of his illness not later than the mid-1950's and
stopped smoking on learning of his condition. Thus, every case litigated
77 Id. at 280-89.
78 Id. at 38.
79 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
80 Note 43 supra.
81 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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to date has concerned a plaintiff who did all of his smoking and con-
tracted cancer prior to the onset of the health scare. This is a fact of
critical importance which, as will be shown, has largely influenced the
outcome of the first round of cigarette-cancer cases, all of which have
been decided in favor of the respective cigarette manufacturers. Parts A
and B of this section are entirely devoted to these cases and the issues
principally involved.
The remainder of the section (parts C and D) considers the hypo-
thetical case which will inevitably arise-that of the smoker who, in
spite of the repeated warnings, continues to smoke, develops lung can-
cer subsequent to the onset of the health scare, and thereafter brings
suit against the tobacco company to recover damages. This situation
poses a new set of issues for the courts to consider. It is likely, however,
that the outcome in these future cases will not vary significantly from
the results in the cases already litigated.
A. The Cigarette-Cancer Cases to Date
The most famous of the cigarette-cancer cases, Green v. American
Tobacco Co.,8 2 provides an excellent illustration of the long and tortuous
road faced by a would-be plaintiff in one of these cases. Since the Green
case highlights a number of the legal issues in this area, it is worth exam-
ining in some detail.
1. The Green Litigation
Edwin Green began smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes in 1924 or 1925,
when he was sixteen years old. For the next thirty years, he smoked one
to three packs of cigarettes a day. On February 1, 1956, Green learned
that he had contracted cancer of the lung. Nearly two years later, in
December 1957, he instituted suit against the American Tobacco Com-
pany for $1.5 million, claiming that the company was responsible for
his illness. Green died the following February, at the age of 49, and the
suit was continued by his son, the appointed administrator of his estate,
and by his widow. 83
The plaintiff's theory 4 was that the American Tobacco Company had
warranted the fitness and merchantability of its product 8 and should be
82 Complete citations are given in connection with the subsequent discussion.
83 Such a procedure is authorized by Florida law, which provides for survival of the
cause of action for personal injuries. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 45.11 (Supp. 1965).
84 Plaintiff originally asserted six separate counts in his complaint, but ultimately
pressed only the implied warranty theory.
85 Under Florida law, no distinction was drawn between the two types of warranty.
Since that time, however, Florida has passed the UCC which draws such a distinction.
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 672.2-314-315 (1966).
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held liable for any harm caused by breach of that implied warranty. At
the close of the trial, the jury was instructed to answer four written in-
terrogatories: (1) Did the decedent have primary cancer in his left lung?
(2) Was lung cancer one of the causes of his death? (3) Was the smok-
ing of Lucky Strike cigarettes a proximate cause of defendant's illness?
(4) Could defendant, prior to February 1, 1956, "by the reasonable
application of human skill and foresight," have known that users of
Lucky Strike cigarettes would be in danger of contracting lung cancer?
The jury answered the first three interrogatories in the affirmative.
Its response to the fourth, however, was negative, and consequently, it
returned a general verdict for the defendant.8 6 Thus, the fourth interroga-
tory-reflecting the trial judge's view that inability to foresee harm con-
stitutes a defense to implied warranty liability-proved decisive at the
trial level.
It was the alleged invalidity of this legal assumption by the trial judge
that served as the major ground for appeal to the Fifth Circuit. The
Court of Appeals observed that implied warranty liability is predicated
on the theory that the consumer, relying on the seller's superior knowl-
edge and skill concerning his product, may justifiably expect that the
product can safely be put to its intended use. Where such superior
knowledge and skill does not exist, the buyer's reliance can no longer
be justified and the predicate for implied warranty liability ceases to
exist. Since, according to the jury verdict, American Tobacco Company
was in no better position than the consuming public to appreciate the
hazard inhering in cigarettes, the court found no implied warranty and
affirmed the decision below.87
In a strong dissent, Judge Cameron maintained that under Florida
law the manufacturer's inability to foresee the harm does not constitute
a defense. The essence of his dissent was that warranty liability is akin
to strict liability and is unaffected by a showing that defendant exer-
cised reasonable care.88
A petition for rehearing was filed. In view of the strong dissent, the
court granted the rehearing for the sole purpose of certifying the con-
tested issue to the Supreme Court of Florida. 9 Pursuant to the certifica-
tion, the Supreme Court of Florida determined conclusively that the
seller's knowledge of the danger inhering in its product was irrelevant,
under Florida law, to an action in implied warranty.Y0
86 3 Personal Injury Newsletter 110 (1960).
87 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
88 Id. at 77-85 (dissenting opinion).
89 Such procedure is authorized under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (1961).
90 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
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Since the Fifth Circuit's decision had rested on an erroneous interpre-
tation of Florida law, the case came before that court for a second time,
with both parties urging that a new trial was unnecessary. The plaintiff
contended that the advisory opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of
Florida required an entry of judgment in his favor, with remand only
to determine the size of the award. The defendant manufacturer, on the
other hand, argued that its undertaking should be limited either to
(a) providing an article of quality and workmanship equal to others
currently on the market, or (b) supplying a product free from any
foreign substance or substandard ingredient. Since the defendant had
met both of these obligations, it urged the -court to adhere to its former
decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted neither approach.
Rather, as a result of the Florida Supreme Court's advisory opinion, the
court now interpreted the scope of the manufacturer's undertaking as
an assurance that its product is "reasonably fit and wholesome" for
human (i.e., public) consumption.91 Since the jury had never passed on
the question whether the Lucky Strike cigarettes did in fact meet the
reasonable fitness test, the court of appeals remanded for the jury to
resolve this issue of fact.92
This decision evoked another vigorous dissent by Judge Cameron. He
was of the opinion that the breach of defendant's implied warranty had
already been conclusively determined by the jury and that a remand
was unnecessary:
The finding of the jury has settled the fact that the cigarettes sold to
Green were not reasonably fit and wholesome for use by him. No other
question is, in my opinion, involved under the law of Florida with which
alone we are dealing.93
The case was remanded to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, the site of the original trial. On November
27, 1964, it was ready to go to the jury for the second time. The judge's
rambling charge to the jury reflected the holding of the court of appeals:
The burden is upon the plaintiff, as I have stated before, to prove, first,
that the cigarettes were not reasonably fit or wholesome, as the case may
be, for the use of the general public and for the use for which they were
sold.
.... The mere fact that Green died would not in itself establish an
unwholesome condition. But the question is, are cigarettes unwholesome
91 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 943 (1964).
92' Id. at 679.
98 Id. at 681 (dissenting opinion).
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for the general public? If they are unwholesome, then Green and Green's
widow and Green's estate would be entitled to recover damages.9 4
After reviewing the instructions with counsel, the court called the
jury back for the following clarification:
I also told you that the question was one of a common danger to the
general public as distinguished from Mr. Green. That is for your deter-
mination. And if these cigarettes did endanger any important number of
cigarette smokers-any responsible number-any large segment of those
smokers-then it would be a breach of the implied warranty for fitness,
which is imposed upon the manufacturer who sells the cigarettes.
If they did not, there would be no breach of warranty. 5
Side bar conference with counsel produced this further clarification:
Counsel do not like the words "important number." They think that it
is a little bit too definitive. I mean, does it endanger any responsible
segment of the general public? Does cigarette smoking endanger them
as to the threat of lung cancer? If it does, the implied warranty is vio-
lated.9 6
An hour and a half later, the jury was ready with its decision-a
unanimous verdict in favor of defendant American Tobacco Com-
pany.97 Whether the case has been finally laid to rest, however, remains
to be seen. 8
2. The Lartigue, Ross, and Pritchard Cases
As of the present writing, three other cigarette-cancer cases have been
fully litigated: 99 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' Ross V.
Philip Morris & Co.,191 and Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co."92
94 Green v. American Tobacco Co., CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. 1 5341, at 6090 (S.D. Fla.
1964).
95 Id. at 6096.
96 Ibid.
97 However, the jury foreman was sufficiently impressed by the trial to quit smoking
himself. After the trial he remarked: "If we had had to decide if cigarettes are safe, we
would have said 'no.' . . . But the judge told us specifically to decide if cigarettes are
reasonably safe and wholesome for human consumption. . . . We decided the key
word was 'reasonable.'" N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1964, p. 15, col. 1.
98 An appeal to the Fifth Circuit was filed by the Green family on January 25, 1965.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1965, p. 20, col. 1.
99 Six other cases have been decided on various procedural grounds without having
been heard on the merits: R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
1963) (statute of limitations runs from the time decedent's lung cancer first became
apparent to him); Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961) (preclusion
order arising out of insufficient pre-trial statement declared to be in conflict with the
federal rules); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960)
(similar to holding in Hudson); Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp.
22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958)
(summary judgment for defendent, plaintiff havnig failed to show that representations com-
plained of were actually made); Deshields v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., (MD. Pa.
1958, unreported) (mistrial-no decision on the merits); Sharp v. P. Lorillard Co. (ED.
La. 1958, unreported) (mistrial-no decision on the merits).
100 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
101 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
102 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) ; 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
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In Lartigue, plaintiff sued both Liggett & Myers and R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Companies when her husband died of lung and laryngeal can-
cer, alleging that his illness was due to his long history of smoking de-
fendants' tobacco products (from 1899 to 1954). Plaintiff contended
that, since cigarettes are manufactured for human consumption, the
manufacturer's warranty should be co-extensive with the warranty of a
food processor. As such, a cigarette manufacturer should be held to
warrant the wholesomeness of his product and be strictly liable for any
injuries due to its unwholesomeness.
The court accepted the analogy to cases involving food, but observed
that in food cases strict liability had been imposed only where the harm
was a foreseeable consequence of the defect. Even in food cases no lia-
bility had been imposed where the type of harm involved could not have
been foreseen at the time the injury occurred. The court attempted to
distinguish between the extent of knowledge required to support a claim
for negligence, and the very limited degree of foreseeability that is a
prerequisite for breach of warranty:
Under the doctrine of strict liability it is not necessary for the plaintiff
to show that the defendant failed to use due care or that the defendant
had knowledge of the defective condition. However, it is necessary to
show that the warranteed product contained an element from which, on
the basis of existing knowledge, harm might be expected to flow.
... Thus far, public policy has not decreed absolute liability for "the
harmful effects of which no developed skill or foresight can avoid."'10 3
In importing this quasi-negligence standard into the warranty field,
the Lartigue court relied heavily upon the initial decision of the Fifth
Circuit, in Green v. American Tobacco Co.,104 that inability to foresee
harm affords the manufacturer a viable defense. All basis for reliance
upon Green was destroyed, however, when subsequent certification to the
Supreme Court of Florida forced a reversal in the Green court's initial
position.Y0 5 The position taken in Lartigue, therefore, was weakened con-
siderably by the subsequent about face in Green. 6
103 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 100, at 35, 39. A number of
writers have suggested that this position is tantamount to exonerating the manufacturer
from liability for breach of warranty whenever he can prove that he has not been negli-
gent. See 1 Framer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16.03[41[a], at 386.4 (1965); Rossi,
"The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Explored," 34 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 399, 410-11 (1961); 3 Personal Injury Newsletter 165 (1960).
104 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
105 325 F.2d 673 (Sth Cir. 1963). See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
106 It is ironic to note that the majority of the court of appeals in the second Green
decision relied upon the Lartigue case, even though Lartigue had in turn relied upon the
faulty original Green decision. judge Cameron, in his dissent, was strongly critical of
the majority for placing reliance upon the Lartigue decision. Green v. American Tobacco
Co., supra note 105, at 679-82 (dissenting opinion).
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Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., °7 reached a similar result based on
analogous facts. Between 1934, when Ross first became a confirmed
smoker, and 1952, when he was operated upon for cancer of the larynx,
he smoked as many as three to four packs a day of defendant's Philip
Morris cigarettes. In his suit against the tobacco company for breach of
implied warranty, the outcome again hinged on the defendant's ability
to anticipate that cigarettes might be harmful. The analogy to food
cases was again presented, but the cigarette suits were distinguished by
the court. A food supplier can foresee the general type of harm that
his product might create, i.e., that in a small number of instances, food
might become contaminated-even though the particular type of con-
tamination may be unforeseeable. In contrast, the tobacco manufacturer
could not, at the time plaintiff contracted his illness, have anticipated the
potentially harmful consequences of cigarettes. Hence, the court held
the manufacturer's lack of opportunity for knowledge to be a valid de-
fense, relying on similar outcomes in the Green and Lartigue cases. 08
The fourth of the major cases, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co.,10 9 adopted a somewhat different approach from the other three cases.
Otto Pritchard, a confirmed smoker of Chesterfield cigarettes since 1921,
sued the Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company to recover damages for
lung cancer which he contracted in 1953, basing his complaint on theories
of negligence and breach of warranty. The first trial resulted in a directed
verdict on the negligence count and a dismissal of the count based on
warranty. When the negligence issue was presented to the Third Circuit,
it suggested that the cigarette manufacturer might have been under a
duty to conduct experiments for the purpose of determining whether his
product was potentially hazardous. It was held a question of fact for
the jury whether the manufacturer had acted reasonably in failing to
conduct such tests at a time when adverse medical evidence was begin-
ning to accumulate. The court also found that the evidence suggested
support for the plaintiff's warranty claims, both express and implied,
and ruled that the jury should be given an opportunity to consider these
claims." 0 On remand, the jury found that cigarettes caused cancer, but
denied recovery on an assumption of the risk theory."'
107 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
108 The Eighth Circuit recognized that the second decision in Green v. American
Tobacco Co., supra note 105, had reached an opposite result based on Florida law. In
deciding this question under Missouri law, the court pointed out that the Green decision
was not dispositive of this issue. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 107, at 12.
The court failed to observe, however, that its reliance upon Lartigue was subject to the
same defect, since Lartigue in turn had relied on the first Green decision.
-19 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
110 Id. at 301.
111 Specific questions were submitted to the jury: "Q. Was the smoking of Chester-
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When the case reached the Third Circuit for the second time, the
court of appeals held that the jury had been erroneously instructed with
regard to assumption of the risk. Noting that this defense is often con-
fused with contributory negligence, the court decided that another
remand was necessary to clarify the distinction for the jury. It also dis-
cussed the Pennsylvania Sales Act provision dealing with express war-
ranty, and concluded that the plaintiff's failure to rely on the warranty
should not necessarily preclude recovery.112
B. An Analysis of the Legal Issues Presented
1. The Plaintiff's Case
In his suit against the cigarette manufacturer to recover for lung-
cancer damages, a number of theories of liability are available to the
would-be plaintiff. He can bring his suit in negligence,"" he can sue for
intentional misrepresentation, or he can press his claim in warranty--
either express or implied. The first two theories, however, afford vir-
tually no chance of recovery: the negligence claim because of the dif-
ficulty (or impossibility) of showing that defendant was aware or should
have been aware of the hazard created by his product, and misrepresenta-
tion because of the insurmountable burden of establishing intent to de-
ceive. Because warranty represents plaintiff's best hope for recovery,
the warranty issues have been vigorously contested in all the cases to date.
In any warranty action, plaintiff must establish the following matters
to make out his case in chief: (a) scope of the warranty (and breach
thereof), (b) causal connection between defendant's breach and plaintiff's
injury, and (c) privity.
(a) Scope of the Warranty. The plaintiff who sues in warranty has
two potential bases for recovery. If the defendant has made affirmations
relating to the quality of his goods, then an express warranty theory may
be open to plaintiff. If the defendant has not made such express affirma-
tions, plaintiff will be forced to fall back on implied warranty.
Express warranty, where available, eases plaintiff's burden consider-
field cigarettes by the plaintiff the cause or one of the causes of cancer in Mr. Pritchard's
right lung? A. Yes. . . ." "Q. Was there a breach of warranty implied by law as defined
in the charge? A. No." "Q. Did the plaintiff assume the risk of injury by his smoking of
Chesterfield cigarettes? A. Yes." N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 27, col. 1. The defense
of assumption of the risk, not mentioned in any of the prior Pritchard decisions, was
added by amendment in September 1962 and pressed at the trial on remand. 5 Personal
Injury Newsletter 147 (1962).
112 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
113 A claim for negligence against the manufacturer would have to be based on one
of the following grounds: (a) failure to keep abreast of scientific developments; (b) failure
to test for composition of the product; (c) failure to warn of dangers which were known
or should have been discovered; or (d) assurances of safety made without any reasonable
basis. Ross!, supra note 103, at 402-03.
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ably. He need not show that the product is "defective" (a prerequisite
in any implied warranty action); he need only show that the product is
not as represented. Express warranty suits have generally proceeded
under Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act,114 although in many states
today the more liberal provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
are available."'
In the cigarette-cancer cases, express warranty achieved its most
notable success in the first Pritchard appeal." 6 There it was argued that
defendant's assurances that "nose, throat, and accessory organs [would
not be] . . . adversely affected by smoking Chesterfields" amounted to
an express warranty. The Third Circuit agreed, stating that: "The evi-
dence compellingly points to an express warranty ... [and] in addition
the jury could very well have concluded that there were express assur-
ances of no harmful effect on the lungs.""' 7
Needless to say, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. has not been the only
cigarette manufacturer to issue such statements. During the 1930's and
1940's, all of the major cigarette manufacturers were making statements
intended to lull the smoker into a sense of security: "Do you Inhale?
What's there to be afraid of?", "More Doctors Smoke Camels .... .", etc.
Such assurances of safety might well amount to express warranties, 118
and it would be no defense that at the time the statements were made
defendant believed them to be true."9 The chief issue presented in a suit
based on such assurances is whether these statements are deemed ex-
pressions of fact or opinion. If defendant's statements (advertising or
otherwise) are classified as factual assurances of safety, rather than
mere puffing, then liability ensues with a showing that the product caused
plaintiff's injury-i.e., that the goods were not in fact safe as war-
ranted. 20 The categorization of these statements as fact or opinion is
generally a question for the jury. 2'
114 USA § 12 provides: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating
to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise
is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon."
115 UCC § 2-313 provides: "(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as fol-
lows: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise." Thus, the reliance
requirement of the USA § 12 has been dropped in the Code, and a "basis of the bargain"
requirement has been substituted therefor.
116 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
117 295 F.2d 292, 296.
118 See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
119 See Noel, "Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability," 24 Tenn.
L. Rev. 963, 1000 (1957), discussing Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash 123, 128, 35 P.2d
1090, 1092 (1934).
120 See I Williston, Sales § 203 (1948) and cases cited therein.
121 See 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 103, § 19.04[2] (1965).
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If defendant's statements do not amount to an express warranty, then
plaintiff will have to frame his suit in implied warranty. Such a warranty
may take one of two forms: an implied warranty of fitness-an under-
taking that the product be reasonably fit for the particular purpose for
which it will be used, or an implied warranty of merchantability-an
undertaking that the product be suitable for the general and ordinary
purposes for which it will be used.'22 Under either warranty, plaintiff
makes out his case in chief by establishing (1) that the product was
"defective" when it left the manufacturer, either by not being fit for
the buyer's particular purpose (fitness) or by not being suitable for his
ordinary purposes (merchantability), and (2) that the "defect" was
responsible for plaintiff's injuries."'
While the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability can often
be used interchangeably,' 4 such is not the case in the cigarette-cancer
suits. In these suits it is admitted by all that the cigarettes in question are
fit for their primary intended use: smoking. In other words, they "work;"
they are made of commercially satisfactory tobacco, and they deliver
the pleasure and satisfaction expected of them. As such, they are
unquestionably fit for the particular purpose for which they are to
be used, thereby satisfying the manufacturer's implied warranty of
fitness. 125
The implied warranty of merchantability, however, imposes different
standards upon the manufacturer, requiring him to supply goods that
are suitable for "the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.""20
This suggests that even though a product is fit for its primary intended
use, it is nevertheless not merchantable if it cannot be used without risk
122 See, e.g., USA § 15, which provides in part:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of
that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
123 See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 922 (D.C. Munic.
App. 1962).
124 See Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931);
Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality," 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 133
(1943).
125 The case would be otherwise if the tobacco contained some foreign body-e.g.,
a human toe-that rendered it unfit for the primary purpose of smoking. See Pillars v.
R. 1. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
126 UCC § 2-314(2)(c). See George v. Willman, 379 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1963); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Prosser, supra note
124, at 130-36.
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of bodily harm. The distinction between primary and secondary purpose
was first recognized in an early Supreme Court opinion in a case involving
the sale of rags for paper-making purposes. The rags produced paper
of excellent quality, but they were infested with smallpox bacteria.
Several workers became infected, and an implied warranty claim ensued.
In response to the defense that the rags were perfectly fit for making
paper, the purpose for which they were sold, the Supreme Court said:
A warranty, express or implied, that rags sold are fit to be manufactured
into paper, is broken, not only if they will not make good paper, but
equally if they cannot be made into paper at all, without killing or
sickening those employed in the manufacture.1 2 7
It might be thought that this kind of reasoning should not apply to
the cigarette-cancer cases where, unlike smallpox bacteria in rags, the
carcinogenic elements in cigarettes are not peculiar to one brand alone,
but inhere in the very product itself. It is said to follow, therefore, that
the cigarette manufacturer ought to be exonerated as long as the tobacco
he uses is commercially satisfactory.ls' This argument has been re-
jected by a long line of cases. In Chapman v. Brown,12 for example, a
young girl was badly burned when her hula skirt caught fire and proved
highly flammable. In a suit against the manufacturer, the court held that
the implied warranty of merchantability did not simply mean that the
skirt must conform to contemporary standards of style and appearance.
Rather, the manufacturer was also held to have warranted that the skirt
would be safe to wear as clothing. Significantly, the court expressly
rejected the argument that all other hula skirts on the market were
subject to the same infirmity. The fact that the manufacturer meets
127 Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630, 646 (1887). Accord, Davidson v. Wee, 93 Ariz.
191, 379 P.2d 744 (1963) (home permanent causing baldness); Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242
Mass. 450, 136 N.E. 252 (1922) (dye in fur collar creating dermatitis). An excellent
recent example is Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110 (1960),
where a spot remover performed competently in removing spots but caused plaintiff to
contract infectious hepatitis. The court held that the fact that the product was fit for
the particular purpose of removing spots did not preclude a further warranty that the
product was fit for the general purposes for which it was sold. Id. at 490-91, 158 A.2d
at 117-18.
A line of cases involving caustic burns from handling wet cement has gone the other
way. Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956); Katz
v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959); Dalton v. Pioneer
Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951). These decisions, however,
have all been strongly influenced by the fact that the caustic nature of cement is com-
mon knowledge. 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 103, § 19.032][al, at 509. With
cigarettes, of course, the cancer-causing properties were unknown before the health-scare
period.
128 See Note, "Cigarettes, Lung Cancer, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality," 50 Cal. L. Rev. 566, 568-69 (1962); Note, "Warranty and Negligence Liability
of Cigarette Manufacturers for User's Lung Cancer," 26 Albany L. Rev. 354, 358 (1962).
129 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
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community standards is no defense, and does not relieve him of liability
for putting an unsafe product on the market.130
At least one of the cigarette-cancer cases seems to have recognized the
distinction between primary and secondary purposes and required ciga-
rettes to satisfy both standards. In the first Pritchard case the Third
Circuit interpreted the warranty as an assurance that "cigarettes were
reasonably fit and generally intended for smoking without causing physical
injury."" ' Thus, the court envisioned the warranty as going beyond an
assurance that cigarettes are made of commercially satisfactory tobacco.
According to the Third Circuit, the manufacturer also warrants that his
cigarettes will not cause physical injury.1 32 This test is akin to the test
set forth in the Fifth Circuit's second Green decision, where the manu-
facturer was held to warrant that his product is "reasonably fit and
wholesome for human consumption." '133
The Pritchard and Green cases, by refusing to limit the merchantability
warranty in the manner contended for by the cigarette manufacturers
(i.e., to an undertaking to supply commercially satisfactory tobacco),
are clearly in line with the trend of decisions that have considered this
issue.'34 With the scope of the warranty thus established, plaintiff must
turn his attention to establishing that the defect in cigarettes caused his
injury.
(b) Causation. Proof of the causal connection between plaintiff's
cigarette smoking and his lung cancer is generally accomplished by pre-
senting evidence in the following manner:' 35 A medical expert, who may
or may not have been acquainted with the plaintiff, is given a set of
hypothetical facts based upon the plaintiff's smoking history, general
130 198 F. Supp. at 94-95.
The allergy cases are to the same effect. In those cases, as long as the plaintiff can
establish that he belongs to a class of persons who react in the same way, he establishes
his right to recover (assuming the manufacturer has failed to provide an appropriate
warning), despite the fact that other products on the market might be capable of in-
ducing the same reaction. See Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460,
162 A.2d 513 (1960) (hair remover ointment produced contact dermatitus; "an appreciable
number of people" would suffer a like reaction); Bianchi v. Denhoim & McKay Co., 302
Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939) (plaintiff sensitive to aniline dyes used in defendant's
face powder; at least "some" other persons would also be sensitive); Zirpola v. Adam
Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (CL Err. & App. 1939) (contact with hat
sweatband caused severe skin reaction; "four or five percent" of all users would react
similarly).
131 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (1961) [Emphasis
added].
132 But see the dissent by Judge Goodrich, apparently taking a different view. Id. at
301-02 (dissenting opinion).
133 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 943 (1964).
134 See cases cited in note 127 supra.
135 The suggested mode of proof is taken from 12 Am. Jur. "Proof of Facts" 345,
418-52 (1962).
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physical condition, past medical history, particular diseases suffered, and
the type of cancerous cells found in the victim's lung tissue. He is asked
his opinion as to the probable cause of the lung cancer and given an
opportunity to state that the cigarette smoking caused the disease. He is
then requested to state the grounds of this opinion. In response to this
question, most of the medical material set out in Section II, supra, may
be introduced into evidence. In particular, the witness may testify to
the physiological changes that have been observed in the respiratory
systems of heavy smokers, the laboratory experiments in which con-
densed tars have produced skin cancer in mice, and the mass of statistical
evidence showing a high correlation between smoking and increased
mortality rates. An effective presentation of this evidence provides an
extremely convincing case for causation.
It has been ruled that evidence of this sort cannot be withheld from
the jury,"8' and once such evidence is presented to them, juries have
not been reluctant to find for plaintiff on the issue of causation.'
(c) Privity. Historically, it has been thought that a consumer who
was injured by a defective product could recover from the defendant
only if he could show that some sort of contractual relationship existed
between them. Absent privity, the plaintiff's suit was barred. Gradually,
however, the courts recognized that this requirement made little sense
where complex modern selling methods were concerned. 3 Privity simply
forced the injured consumer to recover from the retailer who sold him
the product; the retailer then had to pursue his remedy against the
wholesaler, and the wholesaler in turn had to sue the manufacturer. By
abolishing privity, the consumer was encouraged to sue the manufacturer
directly, and the loss could be placed where it ultimately ought to lie
without the multiplicity of law suits.
The reform came first in the area of negligence with the decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."3 9 Since MacPherson, the privity doc-
trine in suits involving negligence has all but disappeared in virtually
every American jurisdiction. 4 9 The action in implied warranty, how-
ever, has generally been regarded differently, and the privity require-
ment has had a much more lasting influence in this area. 4' But in
136 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 131, at 295-96.
137 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1962); Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., retrial reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 27, col. 1.
138 See, generally, 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 103, § 16.03.
139 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
140 Prosser, Torts § 96, at 661 (3d ed. 1964).
141 Although privity has traditionally applied to all types of warranty actions-both
express and implied-it has been more rigidly applied in implied warranty cases. Courts
have generally found it much easier to overlook privity where an express warranty is
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recent years, the privity "citadel" has been "assaulted" in breach of
warranty actions as well, particularly where food, drugs and products
intended for intimate bodily use are concerned.'42
A substantial majority of state courts have held that lack of privity
should not constitute a bar, to recovery against a manufacturer of
food. 43 In these jurisdictions, the courts have had little difficulty ex-
panding the "food category" to include tobacco products on the theory
that tobacco, like food, is a product intended for intimate bodily use.""-
Since the four major cigarette cases to date have all been commenced
in jurisdictions where the privity rule has been abolished with respect
to food manufacturers, lack of privity has caused no serious difficulty
thus far.' 45 With the barrier now beginning to crumble even in cases
not involving food, 46 it is likely that privity will continue to offer little
difficulty in future cigarette-cancer cases. Even if such an action were
commenced in a state still rigidly adhering to privity, the policy argu-
ments against the doctrine are so compelling that a court might well
seize the opportunity and do away with it once and for all.
In theory, once the plaintiff establishes these points, he has made out
his case in chief and should be entitled to recover. That is, since war-
ranty is in the nature of strict liability, a showing of defectiveness coupled
with causation, without more, should establish plaintiff's right to recover.
involved, generally on the theory that the manufacturer has aimed his representations
directly at the ultimate consumer. See Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir.
1946); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); 1 Frumer & Friedman,
supra note 103, § 16.0414] [a].
142 See Prosser, "The Assault Upon the Citadel; Strict Liability to the Consumer," 69
Yale L.J. 1099 (1960); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.2d
39 (1961).
143 Twenty-one jurisdictions have abandoned privity in cases involving food manu-
facturers: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, Oregon, and Vermont. In addition, five states have done
so by statute: Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana and South Carolina. In 12
jurisdictions recovery on a theory of strict liability has been denied: Alabama, Arkansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin. The remainder of the states have
taken no definite position on the question. Prosser, Torts § 97; Restatement (Second), Torts
§ 402A (1965).
144 For earlier cases involving chewing tobacco, see Liggett & Myers Co. v. Rankin, 54
S.W.2d 612 (Ky. Ct. App. 1932); Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490,
78 So. 365 (1918). For the purposes of the Federal Trade Commission Act, it has been
held that cigarettes are neither a "food" nor a "drug" within the meaning of § 15 of
that Act. FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd
mem., 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
For applicability to cigarette-cancer cases, see Note, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 368-69 (1962).
145 In the one case where the defense was raised, the court quickly disposed of the
issue. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 8 (8th Cir. 1964).
146 The landmark case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
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In fact, however, the warranty action is a hybrid-a cross between tort
and contract-and as a result the underlying strict liability rationale has
become infused with concepts derived-from these two fields. In the
cigarette-cancer cases these engrafted concepts have, without exception,
enabled the defendant tobacco company to defeat plaintiff's cause in
every suit brought thus far.
2. The Defendant's Case: The Significance of Foreseeability
and Reliance
Products liability law may be roughly divided into two broad cate-
gories: cases in which defendant is liable for some fault or neglect on
his part, and cases in which defendant is liable in the absence of any
fault or neglect.14 7 These two categories, however, are not mutually
exclusive, and decisions nominally holding defendant liable without fault
often turn out, on further analysis, to have been grounded on transmuted
concepts of fault and neglect. This has typically been true of the implied
warranty action. In theory, warranty liability ensues automatically when
a defective product causes injury.'48 In practice, however, it has not
worked out that way. Over the years, the implied warranty action has
been encumbered with certain prerequisites which have brought it closer
on the spectrum to negligence than to strict liability. As a result, courts
have generally been unwilling to hold the defendant liable in implied
warranty unless these prerequisites, which will be called fault-substi-
tutes, 49 are shown to exist.
Fault-substitutes may take various forms. In the express warranty
cases, the manufacturer's explicit undertaking to stand behind his product
provides the necessary predicate for liability, and no further inquiry into
the defendant's acts or state of mind is required. Where the action is
based on an implied warranty of fitness, the buyer's reliance upon
seller's superior skill and judgment serves as a substitute for fault.150
Where breach of implied warranty of merchantability is alleged, the
required predicate is that the goods have been bought from a merchant.'
.147 The number of products liability cases falling into a third category, involving in-
tentional or willful wrongdoing, is negligible.
148 See 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 103, § 16.01[11], at 358.1.
149 This term is not meant to be limited to negligence concepts. The term is designed
to encompass pre-conditions of all types, drawn from tort and contract alike, which have
transformed the implied warranty action from strict liability into a hybrid.
150 UCC § 2-315. See also USA § 15(1).
151 UCC § 2-314(1). See also USA § 15(2).
The Sales Act predicates this kind of liability upon the goods having been bought "by
description." "By description" simply means that the buyer is relying on the seller to
meet his specifications. In other words, he is relying on the seller's judgment to supply
a product which will satisfy his needs. Cf. Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchant-
able Quality," 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 140-41, 168 (1943).
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In certain instances, an awareness by defendant of the dangerous pro-
pensities of his product has also been required before liability may be
imposed. In each of the cigarette-cancer cases, the plaintiff's inability
to establish the appropriate fault-substitute has been the chief factor
responsible for the tobacco company's successful defense.
(a) Opportunity for Knowledge. With the possible exception of Pritcl-
ard, all of the cigarette-cancer cases to date have decided that the
manufacturer's total inability to foresee the cigarette health hazard
should exonerate him. Thus, at the first Green trial, the jury was asked
to decide whether, "by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight," American Tobacco Company could have known that ciga-
rettes might cause cancer. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit approved the
use of this interrogatory.152 In Lartigue, although the court insisted that
it was not confusing warranty and negligence, it held that the manu-
facturer could be liable "only for a defective condition ... the harmful
consequences of which, based on the state of human knowledge, are
foreseeable." 53 And in Ross, the court approved the trial judge's instruc-
tions which stated that "implied warranty does not cover substances in
the manufactured product the harmful effects of which no developed
skill or foresight can afford knowledge.' 54
These decisions misconstrue the essence of the warranty action. War-
ranty was intended to impose strict liability on the supplier of a defective
product for any injuries caused thereby, and the fact that the supplier
exercised reasonable care has generally been deemed irrelevant. By
permitting the manufacturer to escape liability on a showing that he
was unable to foresee harm, the courts have engrafted a quasi-negligence
standard onto the warranty action, thereby rendering the warranty con-
cept virtually meaningless.
Furthermore, even the underlying factual assumption in these cases-
that prior to the mid-1950's, the manufacturer had no intimation what-
soever that cigarettes might be harmful-may be open to question. As
far back as 1912, a substantial bibliography on the various hazards
associated with cigarettes began to accumulate, 55 and statements spe-
cifically linking cigarettes with lung cancer began to appear in the
152 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 76 (5th Cir. 1962).
153 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 24 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
154 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 6, 10 (8th Cir. 1964).
155 At the first Pritchard trial, plaintiff was frustrated in his attempts to introduce this
bibliography into evidence. On appeal, the refusal to admit this evidence was held not to
constitute an abuse of discretion. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d
292, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1961).
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national communications media as early as 1946.156 When it is also re-
membered that cigarettes had long been thought to have a generally
adverse effect upon health, 5 ' the possibility that cigarettes were harmful
may not have been as unforeseeable as the courts and juries have in-
timated.
(b) Reliance.'5 Traditionally, the buyer's reliance upon the manu-
facturer's superior skill and knowledge has been considered a prerequisite
to any action for breach of warranty.'59 The cigarette cases, however,
have all involved purchases from a manufacturer who could not have
known of the hazard inhering in his product. Since the manufacturer
was unable to obtain superior skill and knowledge concerning his product,
the predicate for reliance was lacking, and the buyer could not satisfy
this requirement. Reasoning in this fashion, the majority in the first
Green decision declared the cigarette manufacturer not liable. 60 The
court in Lartigue employed similar reasoning:
[IJt cannot be said that cigarette smokers who started smoking before
the great cancer-smoking debate relied on the tobacco companies' "war-
anty" that their cigarettes had no carcinogenic element. Today, the manu-
facturer is not an insurer against the unknowable.' 6'
In other words, where the seller is in no better position than the buyer
to discover the defect or to eliminate the risk, reliance is necessarily
lacking and liability will not be imposed.
The reliance requirement presented somewhat greater difficulty for
the Third Circuit in the second Pritckard case. Judge Smith, writing for
the court, apparently felt that absence of reliance ought not bar plain-
tiff's recovery. He adopted a somewhat contorted reading of the Penn-
sylvania Sales Act, thereby nullifying the statutory reliance require-
ment. 6 2 The concurring opinion, taking a more conventional ap-
156 In the New York Times, for example, the number of articles published on this
subject during the 1946-1954 period was as follows: 1 in 1946, 3 in 1949, 2 in 1950, 3
in 1951, 4 in 1952, 12 in 1953 (with 6 in December), and 21 in the first 3 months of
1954. Comment, "Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Risks in Manufacturers' Liability
Under Implied Warranty," 63 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 516 n.4 (1963).
157 Witness the advertising of the cigarette industry during the 1930's indicating that
cigarettes were "mild," "not irritating," and "kind to the throat."
158 While reliance is generally a prerequisite to an implied warranty, and therefore
nominally part of the plaintiff's case, in the cigarette suits reliance is so inextricably tied
up with the state of the manufacturer's knowledge that it must be regarded as an element
of the defense, and not of the plaintiff's case in chief.
159 Both the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code embody this re-
quirement by barring recovery on an implied warranty of merchantability unless the
buyer can show that he relied upon the seller's skill or judgment. USA 15(1); UCC
§ 2-314. The Sales Act also requires reliance in express warranty actions. USA § 12.160 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 77 (5th Cir. 1962).
161 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
162 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1965).
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proach, disagreed with Judge Smith on his reading of the Sales Act, and
argued that plaintiff's failure to establish reliance could preclude re-
covery. 63
In a modern commercial setting, involving the purchase by the smoker
of a distantly-manufactured pack of cigarettes, it is surprising to find
the courts emphasizing the consumer's reliance to this extent. The reli-
ance requirement today is largely anachronistic, a remnant from the early
origins of warranty as a quasi-contractual action. As a contractual
matter, it was thought that the plaintiff could not hold defendant to his
implied promissory conduct unless the plaintiff was influenced in some
way by defendant's implied (or express) promise. This notion makes
little sense, though, where personal injuries are involved. No one would
suggest, for example, that a motorist who is injured by the driving of
another should not recover in tort unless he can show, in addition to the
other elements of his cause of action, that he relied on defendant's care
and driving ability before venturing forth on the highways. Since the
suit to recover for personal injuries caused by a defective product more
nearly approximates the typical tort suit than a claim based on contract
(albeit the motorist example is in negligence, not warranty), it would
seem that the injured consumer should not be obligated to satisfy the
reliance requirement. 64
Nevertheless, the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code,
and most courts have insisted on at least giving lip service to the require-
ment. 65 Reliance today is largely used as a stopgap. Courts in most
instances have been unwilling to pull out all the stops and hold the
manufacturer as an insurer of his product. This had led to a considerable
amount of uncertainty in the law; although courts have frequently man-
aged to "interpret the reliance requirement out of existence,"' 66 they have
adhered firmly to the requirement in instances where it has suited their
purposes. In these instances, of which the cigarette cancer cases are
notable examples, the courts have retained reliance as a fault-substitute
and denied plaintiff's claim whenever he has been unable to establish
this predicate to recovery.
(c) The Allergy Standard. When Green v. American Tobacco Co. came
before the Fifth Circuit for the second time, it carried with it the instruc-
tions of the Florida Supreme Court that under Florida law warranty
does not hinge on the manufacturer's ability to foresee harm. Accord-
163 Id. at 487-92.
164 See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.20, at 1580-81 (1956).
165 USA §§ 12, 15(1); UCC § 2-314; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255
N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); 2 Harper & James, supra note 164.
168 Comment, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 519 (1963).
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ingly, the Court of Appeals redefined the scope of the manufacturer's
warranty in terms of a guarantee that the product be "reasonably fit"
for public consumption and remanded for the jury to determine whether
cigarettes satisfied this standard.-6 7 The trial court, in attempting to
adhere to this directive on remand, instructed the jury that the product
must endanger a "responsible segment of the general public" before the
manufacturer could be held liable. 6 '
The "responsible segment" standard is reminiscent of cases involving
allergies. These cases hold that while it is not necessary for the plaintiff
to show that a normal individual would suffer harm, it is necessary for
him to establish that there is a class of persons-some appreciable pro-
portion of the population-that would be adversely affected by the
product.'69 The rationale is that if damage is done to a sizeable sample
of consumers, it is reasonable to expect that the manufacturer should
have foreseen the injury and warned purchasers of the potential hazard. 7 '
Adhering to this rationale the trial court in Green held that while it was
no longer necessary to establish that the manufacturer knew (or should
have known) of the risks entailed, nevertheless, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that he belonged to a "responsible segment" which cigarettes
endanger.
Thus, in one way or another, the court in each of the cigarette-cancer
cases has balked at holding the cigarette manufacturer an insurer of his
product and has insisted upon some fault-substitute as a predicate to
liability. Finding none, the plaintiffs have without exception been denied
recovery. Reliance was emphasized by the first Green appeal and the
second Pritckard decision; Lartigue and Ross hinged on the manufac-
turer's inability to foresee harm; and the latest remand in Green pro-
duced a sub silentio analogy to the allergy standard. It is an open
question whether some of these decisions can be reconciled with existing
precedent. Even if they can, however, the courts have not been giving
these plaintiffs their full due. The courts are seriously at fault for
ignoring the underlying policy considerations which militate in favor
of imposing strict enterprise liability. Instead of emphasizing so heavily
the question of defendant's knowledge, the real debate should have
167 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
168 CCH, Prod. Liab. Rep. ff 5341, at 6096 (S.D. Fla. 1964). [Emphasis added.]
169 See Crotty v. Shartenberg's, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 465-67, 162 A.2d 513, 515-16 (1960)
(allergic reaction to manufacturer's hair remover resulted in dermatitis and impetigo on
plaintiff's upper lip); Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 NJJL. 21, 23-24, 4 A.2d 73,
75 (1939) (dye in hat band caused scalp rash and discoloration of hair). See also Com-
ment, "Allergy and the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose," 25 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 306 (1956); Comment, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 527 (1963).
170 Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 453, 136 N.E. 252 (1922); Note, 112 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 620, 623 (1964).
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centered on the wisdom of holding manufacturers of products intended
for human consumption strictly liable, notwithstanding the absence of
any other predicate to liability.
3. Strict Enterprise Liability'7'
Strict enterprise liability refers to warranty liability in its purest
sense, unencumbered by the fault substitutes that surround the hybrid
previously discussed. To impose strict enterprise liability, plaintiff need
only make out his case in chief as in subsection (1), supra; concepts of
reliance, injury to substantial numbers, and foreseeability are of no
consequence.
Strict enterprise liability stems from an acknowledgment that as be-
tween the consumer and the manufacturer, the latter is the one who is
in a position to exercise control over the product. 72 Legal scholars have
long debated its pros and cons, thoroughly analyzing the underlying
reasons and sentiment in its favor ' 73 Two reasons have been most fre-
quently advanced for imposing strict enterprise liability. First, the
higher degree of liability can act as a deterrent, discouraging the
irresponsible marketing of goods which might prove harmful to the
consumer. The hope is that strict liability will encourage manufacturers
to take every possible precaution to insure the safety of their products,
ferreting out potential defects wherever possible. Even where the pos-
sibility of a defect is not readily apparent, the manufacturer can be
encouraged to conduct a continuing program of research and experi-
mentation. Needless to say, the manufacturer is the only one who has
at his disposal the means to conduct such a program; the law cannot
171 Professor Ehrenzweig was the first to coin this expression. James, "General Prod-
ucts-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?" 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923 (1957).
172 The one cigarette-cancer case that acknowledged this concept, and took it into
account, was Green v. American Tobacco Co., on certification to the Supreme Court of
Florida. In holding that the manufacturer's implied warranty liability is not limited by
foreseeability, the court said:
The assumption of responsibility, even implied assumption, is not, of course, neces-
sarily co-equivalent with skill and knowledge. To the extent that our cases take
note of a defendant's opportunity for knowledge, it is merely in recognition of a
supplier's superior position, relative to the purchasing public, as a factor affecting
policy considerations rather than determining the limits of implied warranty liability
in a particular situation.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1963) [Footnote omitted.].
173 Background for the analysis which follows was culled from the following sources:
Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts," 70 Yale L.J.
499 (1961); Green, "Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without
Negligence?" 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 928 (1957); Gregory, "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability," 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951); James, supra note 171; James, "Products Liability,"
34 Tex. L. Rev. 192 (1955); Noel, "Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward
Strict Liability," 24 Ten. L. Rev. 963 (1957); Plant, "Strict Liability of Manufacturers
for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View," 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938
(1957).
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possibly expect the consumer, or the retailer, to conduct extensive tests
to unearth defects or potential hazards.
Second, it is pointed out that the manufacturer, once he has com-
pensated plaintiff for his loss, need not shoulder the burden alone (as
would the plaintiff). After absorbing the loss initially, the manufacturer
can charge it off as a production cost, and eventually recoup by increas-
ing his selling price to recover the cost. The result is that the loss,
instead of being borne entirely by the plaintiff, is allocated evenly (and
in minute amounts) among the consuming public.
Sentiment also favors the imposition of strict liability upon the manu-
facturer. The manufacturer, after all, set in motion the process which
led to plaintiff's injury. He is the active party and ought to bear any
loss that his activity entails. Moreover, as between the consumer and
the industry, the manufacturer has a "deep pocket," and can better
afford the loss. Should the manufacturer not be able to absorb the loss,
he can always cover himself in advance by procuring products liability
insurance.
Although these theories have been expounded by legal scholars for
many years, they have not met with approval in the courts. Judges have
long been reluctant to restrict the freedom of movement of a would-be
merchant (or investor) by placing his incipient business under a cloud
of strict liability. Recently, however, there have been rumblings which
suggest that strict enterprise liability may no longer be regarded as mere
academic theorizing. In Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,"4 defendant
had marketed a new crop-dusting chemical, which was meant to be
sprayed on crops from an airplane. The spray had a far greater capacity
to drift than other sprays of a similar type, and as a result, foliage in an
adjoining field was destroyed. In a suit to recover damages, the court
held the manufacturer liable on the ground that defendant should be
"charged with the knowledge which tests would have revealed."'71 5 This
represents genuine strict liability, since unlike previous cases holding
manufacturers for failure to test, there was no showing in Chapman
v. Taylor that defendant either knew or should have known of the need
to conduct tests for drifting capacity.
California is the only state that has openly received strict liability.
Ever since Judge Traynor's famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 176 the California Supreme Court has been in the
forefront in this area. Judge Traynor's argument finally became the
174 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
175 Id. at 644, 222 S.W.2d 820, 827.
176 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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opinion of the court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,177 where
the court established the concept of "strict liability in tort." Under
Greenman, the plaintiff need only show that the manufacturer has placed
a defective product on the market and that his injury was due to the
defect. Notions of privity and reliance no longer govern:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being....
* . . [R]ules defining and governing warranties that were developed
to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked
to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by its defective
products ....
.I. The purpose of such [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.' 78
Assuming that a court can be persuaded of the underlying soundness
of strict enterprise liability, the question remains whether the cigarette
industry is well suited for the accomplishment of its purposes. In that
regard, strict liability insofar as it spreads the plaintiff's loss, clearly
has a salutary effect. The cigarette manufacturer can absorb this loss
initially and thereafter recoup by an across-the-board price increase.
Several writers, however, have attempted to show that this may not
work out in practice.'79 They note that a price increase on an established
product may place the manufacturer at a competitive disadvantage.
Moreover, they point out that if the manufacturer has priced his product
177 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).178 Id. at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01. [Citations omitted.] The
Greenman holding was followed in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391
P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
The Restatement of Torts (Second) has adopted strict tort liability for the seller of a
defective product. Section 402A provides:(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a), the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
According to comment (c), the rationale of section 402A is that the public has a right to
expect sellers to stand behind their goods, that public policy demands that those who
market goods shall bear the burden of any damage inflicted thereby, that this burden is
simply a production cost, and that the seller can better afford this burden.
'Comment- (i), which defines "unreasonably dangerous," notes that many products
cannot possibly be made safe for all consumption. The comment states: "Good tobacco is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful."
'79 Plant, supra note 173, at 946-47; Comment, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 531-35 (1963).
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to maximize profits, as presumably he has, a price increase may cause
profits to slough off, at least where the demand for the product is rela-
tively elastic. The cigarette manufacturer, though, is not subject to either
of these infirmities. The tobacco industry has always been basically
oligopolistic; where one manufacturer has seen fit to raise his prices,
other manufacturers have invariably followed suit, thereby eliminating
price as a competitive factor.' Nor is a price increase likely to cause
profits to slough off. The demand for cigarettes in the past has been
highly inelastic; smokers, habituated to cigarettes, have rarely been
discouraged from buying them simply because the price is increased. 8'
Hence, the cigarette manufacturer who is forced to compensate a plain-
tiff for his lung cancer damages should have little difficulty distributing
the loss among the ultimate consumers.
However, the other frequently-offered justification for strict liability-
the deterrent effect-carries little weight here. Even if strict liability
were imposed in the cases which arise today, its effect would be but a
passing phase in the history of cigarette tort litigation, posing no threat
for the future. Cigarette manufacturers, secure in the knowledge that
the defense of assumption of the risk will protect them against future
tort claims,8 2 will not be motivated to seek additional protection through
the marketing of a safer product.
This is not to say that any one of these considerations is so conclusive
as to compel a decision either for or against the tobacco companies. Strict
enterprise liability may or may not be an appropriate solution to the
dilemma these cases present. But only by analyzing the policy considera-
tions underlying strict liability, and the potential effect of strict liability
on the tobacco industry, can the courts discharge their duty to provide
a just and fair allocation of the plaintiff's loss.
C. Future Cigarette-Cancer Litigation: Assumption of the
Risk as an Affirmative Defense
In the cigarette-cancer cases that have thus far been litigated, assump-
tion of the risk has not played a very prominent role. The reasons are
primarily pragmatic: the defense based on inability to foresee the risk
has proved to be effective;'8 . and the tobacco companies have been
180 Nicholls, Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry 78-89 (1951).
181 Id. at 122, 183-85.
182 Assumption of the risk, which is generally a defense to strict liability, would bar
only those claims for damages incurred after the smoker became aware of the risk. The
requisite awareness clearly exists as of January, 1966 at the very latest (by virtue of the
new federal labeling law), and therefore the production of a safer cigarette from and
after that time can have no effect in reducing the manufacturer's potential liability.
183 See parts A and B, supra.
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somewhat reluctant to argue assumption of the risk because of the
adverse publicity which might ensue if they were to emerge victorious on
this ground.8 Moreover, it would be virtually impossible to show that
a smoker could have been adequately apprised of this risk prior to the
mid-1950's. Despite these factors, it is quite possible that the juries in
these cases have rendered verdicts against the plaintiff on a sub silentio
theory of assumption of the risk; at least one jury has already done
so openly.1
8 5
The defense will undoubtedly become a much more significant issue-
indeed, the central issue-as later cases develop. As the body of scientific
knowledge linking cigarettes and cancer has accumulated, it has become
available to the tobacco companies and the consuming public alike. The
case will inevitably arise where plaintiff's smoking extended wel into
the period when the link between cigarettes and cancer became common
knowledge. In such a case, the advance in scientific knowledge will
have two effects. The defendant will be deprived of its defense based
on inability to foresee harm. But by the same token, the knowledge
gained by the consumer may very well charge him with assumption of
the risk, thereby affording the manufacturer an affirmative defense that
should prove to be an effective substitute for the defense he is forced
to abandon. It becomes relevant, therefore, to examine the requirements
for pleading assumption of the risk and to inquire whether this defense
may properly be raised in an action based on breach of implied war-
ranty."" In particular, we shall focus on the narrow distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
1. The Requirements of Assumption of the Risk
There are two essential requirements upon which assumption of the
risk is predicated: (1) the plaintiff must have incurred the risk volun-
tarily; and (2) he must have comprehended fully the nature of the
risk . 7 The former requirement presents difficulty in cases where the
plaintiff has been forced to make a Hobson's choice, and has had no real
alternative but to assume the risk.' No such forced choice is presented
184 Note 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 254, 258 (1964).
185 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., jury verdict reported in N.Y. Times,
Nov. 10, 1961, p. 27, col. 1.
188 The Third Circuit's second opinion in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
350 F.2d 479, 484-86 (3rd Cir. 1965) contains a detailed analysis of these issues, sub-
stantially along the lines of subsections (1) and (2), infra.
187 Prosser, Torts § 67, at 461 (3rd ed. 1964).
188 For example, where plaintiff's only reasonable means of egress from the land-
lord's building was to use a slippery winding staircase, she was not held to have volun-
tarily assumed the risk. Brandt v. Thompson, 252 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1952). Or where
plaintiff's intestate suffered fatal burns while attempting to rescue her property which
defendant railroad had negligently set on fire, her choice was deemed to have been
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here. Plaintiff might contend that his habituation to tobacco' compelled
him to continue to purchase cigarettes, and that the element of volun-
tariness is lacking. But this contention is easily met, since the plaintiff
was certainly well aware of the habit-forming propensities of tobacco
at the time he commenced smoking. 9' His desire to purchase and use
the manufacturer's product is a voluntary one, made entirely of his
own free will.
Somewhat more complex problems are created by the requirement that
the purchaser fully comprehend the nature of the risk. In a recent
Kansas case,191 plaintiff had entered a room he knew to be filled with
gas in order to open the windows. The gas exploded, and plaintiff was
severely injured. The court held that it was for the jury to determine
whether he had acted with full appreciation of all the risks involved.
In the course of its opinion, the court supplied one of the best expositions
on this rather vague standard:
It is not in every instance where one exposes himself to a known danger
and injury results that he is denied a right to recover, but only in that
class of cases where the danger is so obvious and imminent that a person
of ordinary prudence under like circumstances would not subject himself
to it.... [M] ere knowledge of the danger of doing a certain act without
a full appreciation of the risk involved is not sufficient to preclude a
plaintiff from recovery .... 192
Accordingly, a distinction has been drawn between observation of cir-
cumstances which may give rise to a dangerous situation, and actual
comprehension and appreciation of the full peril inherent in a proposed
course of action.'9" The test is always whether the plaintiff "was so
informed of the dangers inhering in [his acts] ... as to be placed in the
position of one willing to encounter them."
94
dictated by necessity and was held to not constitute an assumption of the risk. Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Silver, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N.E. 362 (1907).
189 Although the Smoking Report characterizes tobacco as a drug, the drive to smoke
cigarettes is characterized as a drug habituation, as opposed to a drug addiction. The
distinctions are as follows: (1) the drive to continue the use of the drug is denominated
a desire, rather than a compulsion; (2) there is little or no tendency to increase the
dose; (3) there is no physical dependence upon the effects of the drug (a psychic
dependence does exist to some degree); (4) detrimental effects, if any, are upon
the individual only, rather than society in general. Smoking Report 349-51.
190 Note, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 620, 624, n. 19 (1964).
191 Wainscott v. Carlson Construction Co., 179 Kan. 410, 295 P.2d 649 (1956).
192 Id. at 413, 295 P.2d at 652.
193 In Shufelberger v. Wordon, 189 Kan. 379, 369 P.2d 382 (1962), for example,
plaintiff agreed to assist defendant in moving a piano by truck. The truck lurched
forward, both plaintiff and the piano were thrown to the ground (the plaintiff under-
neath), and serious injuries ensued. The court applied the Wainscott test, and held that
plaintiff had not fully appreciated the risk when he agreed to assist defendant in moving
the piano.
194 Cardozo, C.j., in Zurich Gen. Acc. and Liab. Ins. Cb. v. Childs Co., 253 N.Y. 325,
328, 171 N.E. 391, 392 (1930). See also Dean v. Martz, 329 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Ky. 1959).
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This rather nebulous'standard must be applied to the purchaser of
cigarettes. If the purchaser were only vaguely aware that tar and nicotine
deposits might prove harmful in isolated instances, and were under the
impression that the average smoker incurred little or no risk, then the
requisite appreciation of the peril would probably be lacking. This may
well have been the state of mind of the average cigarette consumer in
the mid-1950's, when the first medical statements were beginning to
appear, but when unequivocal statements on the subject were noticeably
absent. 95
In light of the Surgeon General's Smoking Report, however, and the
extremely broad publicity attendant upon it, it is almost inconceivable
that a rational smoker could today adhere to such a view. The conclusive
and unequivocal medical pronouncements of recent years to which the
smoker has been exposed compel him to acknowledge that even the
moderate smoker markedly increases his chances of contracting a serious
disease, and that a smoker is much more likely to die prematurely than
a nonsmoker of comparable age and physical stature. Should there
remain any doubt on this score, though, it is unquestionably dispelled by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,"9" which requires
every package of cigarettes to bear a label apprising the smoker of the
risk involved.
Admittedly, juries are often reluctant to bar recovery on the ground
that plaintiff has assumed the risk. 9 7 But for a jury to find that a plaintiff
today does not comprehend the risk, it would have to find that he had
virtually no exposure to communications media. Certainly, if the defense
is to have any viability at all, it ought to apply in a cigarette-cancer case
based on a contemporary factual setting.
2. Applicability of Assumption of the Risk to an Action in Warranty
In a suit for breach of warranty, the narrow distinction between con-
tributory negligence and assumption of the risk is highly significant.
Contributory negligence is based on the plaintiff's failure to exercise due
care. Assumption of the risk, on the other hand, presupposes no fault on
the part of the plaintiff. Rather, it bars his recovery because of his
willingness (express or implied) to endure the consequences of any
hazards he encounters. 98
195 See the recent decision in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479,
486 (3d Cir. 1965), suggesting that the advertising campaigns of the mid-1950's, which
"were calculated to overcome any fears the potential customers might have had as to
the harmful effects of cigarettes," weaken any assumption of the risk argument.
198 79 Stat. 28, 15 U.S.CA. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 1965).
197 Prosser, Torts § 67, at 462 (3d ed. 1964).
198 Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 161-62, 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954).
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Where plaintiff's conduct is merely negligent, but falls short of a
conscious and voluntary assumption of the risk, his action for breach
of implied warranty will generally not be barred.'99 (Of course, an
ordinary claim of negligence would be precluded.) Where, however,
the plaintiff willingly encounters a known risk and subsequently suffers
harm, most courts have held that his appreciation of the danger pre-
cludes recovery for breach of warranty 00
The reason for the distinction seems to be rooted in the biblical
concept of "an eye for an eye." The theory of a negligence suit is
that defendant has failed to exercise due care and must compensate
the plaintiff for any injuries proximately caused thereby. He is ab-
solved of liability where the plaintiff has also failed to exercise care.
The carelessness of one party in effect "cancels out" the carelessness
of the other, and the loss remains where it has fallen-with the plaintiff.
In contrast, the action based on implied warranty is predicated on the
manufacturer's voluntary undertaking to produce a product which he
knows will entail certain risks. Accordingly, the theory of implied war-
ranty imposes a stricter standard of liability upon the defendant
manufacturer when his product does in fact give rise to harm. The
manufacturer is not absolved from his liability by the contributory
negligence of plaintiff, since it would be unfair to allow one who know-
ingly creates a risk to be relieved of liability by another's mere careless
failure to protect himself. Only assumption of the risk will bar the
plaintiff's action for breach of implied warranty, since the wrongs of
the parties are once again matched; the manufacturer's conscious
undertaking is balanced by the plaintiff's knowing and voluntary as-
sumption of the risk. With the two in equilibrium, the law will again
allow the loss to remain where it has fallen-with the plaintiff.
Cases analogous to the fact situation presented by a modem cigarette-
cancer case are rare. The closest analogy would be to cases involving
products liability for consumables-presumably food. Needless to say,
it is not often that a consumer, having become aware of a deleterious
element in his food, has continued to eat it. In a recent California
case, however, the facts suggested that the consumer may have done
199 Prosser, Torts § 78, at 538-39 (3d ed. 1964); 77 C.J.S. "Sales" § 357, at 1266
(1952).
200 For an able discussion of this distinction as applied to a cigarette case, see Pritchard
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 484-86 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Chapman
v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 85-86 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir.
1962); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 451-52, 72 N.W.2d 861, 865-66 (1955); Prosser,
Torts § 95, at 656 (3d ed. 1964). But cf. Simmons v. Wichita Coca Cola Bottling Co., 181
Kan. 35, 38, 209 P.2d 633, 635 (1957).
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just that. In Kassouf v. Lee Bros.,01 the plaintiff was munching on a
candy bar and reading a book at the same time. She noticed that the
candy bar "didn't taste just right," but nevertheless continued to eat
it. It was only after more than a third of the bar had been consumed
that she looked down at the remainder, and observed with horror that
it was literally infested with worms. The ingestion of the candy caused
numerous intestinal disorders, and plaintiff sued to recover damages
for breach of warranty. The court intimated that assumption of the
risk might have barred the plaintiff's action, if it could have been shown
that she had continued to eat the candy after becoming aware of its
deteriorated condition. 2
The cigarette smoker of today is in much the same position, except
that the facts in his situation are even more compelling. He is aware
that medical evidence has clearly indicated cigarettes are the major
cause of lung cancer. He is aware that even the moderate smoker
substantially increases his risk of premature death. Nevertheless, he
continues to smoke. The requirements for assumption of the risk are
all satisfied. It is difficult to imagine twelve reasonable men coming to
any other conclusion.
D. A Further Note on Future Litigation
Assuming that inability to foresee and assumption of the risk are
valid defenses when each is applied in the relevant time period, the
question arises whether these two defenses can occupy the entire field.
That is, can the tobacco companies continue to rely upon the inability-
to-foresee defense in cases where plaintiff's disease was contracted
prior to the mid-1950's, and rely upon assumption of the risk in cases
where plaintiff's disease was contracted after that time? The answer
to this question turns on whether general scientific knowledge in this
field was at all times equally available to both the tobacco industry and
the consuming public. If so, then the two defenses will "meet"; at the
very time when scientific knowledge is regarded as having been adequate
to appraise the manufacturers of the risk (thereby subjecting them to
warranty liability), the consuming public will have become sufficiently
knowledgeable such that their continuing to purchase cigarettes consti-
tuted an assumption of the risk.
However, the premise that knowledge was equally available is ques-
tionable. The tobacco industry, with its superior facilities and greater
201 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
202 Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 572, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276, 278 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
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interest in the problem, was undoubtedly several years ahead of the
consuming public in its awareness of the danger. This gap of several
years constitutes a "gray zone," in which the cigarette manufacturers
knew enough to deprive them of the defense that the risk was un-
foreseeable, while the consuming public knew so little that the average
smoker could not be charged with an assumption of the risk.
Although the idea of a "gray zone" seems persuasive, it is unlikely
that the courts will give an attentive ear to it. For plaintiff to recover,
he would have to prove that the cancer damages were incurred during
this period. Even worse, he would probably be required to apportion
the damages-those incurred during the "gray zone" would be re-
coverable, while others would not. In view of the still rather limited
state of medical knowledge with respect to the development of cancer,
it would be well nigh impossible to establish this proof. If the plaintiff
were permitted to attempt such proof, the burden upon the jury and
the court to determine which portion of his damages were recoverable
would be insurmountable.
To avoid these problems, courts are much more likely to make the
unrealistic but not unreasonable assumption that the knowledge was
at all times equally available to the industry and the general public.
If this assumption is made, the two defenses will occupy the entire
field, and any possible gap through which the. industry's armor might
have been pierced will be closed. Thus, in all probability, tort suits as
a private legal remedy will continue to be as unfruitful in the future
as they have been in the past.
IV
PUBLIC REGULATION
Whether or not the tort suits are successful, the health hazard created
by the mass smoking of cigarettes has been deemed by the Surgeon
General's Advisory Committee to be of sufficient magnitude to require
public remedial action. °3 The Committee was silent, however, as to the
remedial measures to be taken204 and the governmental body to be charged
with primary responsibility for implementing them. As a result, consid-
erable internecine warfare has developed within the Government over the
appropriate method for carrying out the Surgeon General's directive. The
controversy has revolved around a central issue: whether regulation in
this field shall emanate from Congress or from the Federal Trade Com-
203 See Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8328 (1964).
204 This was originally to have been Phase II of the Advisory Committee's task. See
text accompanying notes 37-40 supra. In the light of subsequent developments, however,
the project has apparently been abandoned.
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mission. This section will consider that controversy and the legal ques-
tions it presents.
The Federal Trade Commission was the first governmental body to
take action, and it did so promptly. On January 11, 1964, the very day
that the Smoking Report was released, the FTC announced that it would
"move promptly, within the scope of its statutory jurisdiction and re-
sponsibility," to determine the remedial action which it should take in
the public interest.205 One week later, the Commission issued a notice of
proposed rule making2 6 pursuant to its own newly-promulgated Rules
of Practice. 7
The Commission was in no mood to waste time. Public hearings on the
proposed rule were held March 16-18, 1964. Those presenting their
views included spokesmen for the Tobacco Institute, the Surgeon Gen-
eral's Advisory Committee, and the American Cancer Society. Many
prominent doctors, research scientists and Congressmen also appeared.2 08
Three months later, on June 22, 1964, the FTC issued its trade regulation
rule:
[I]n connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution in com-
merce (as 'commerce' is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act)
of cigarettes it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) to
fail to disclose, clearly and prominently, in all advertising, and on every
pack, box, carton or other container in which cigarettes are sold to the
consuming public that cigarette smoking is dangerous to health and may
cause death from cancer and other diseases. 209
January 1, 1965 was set as the effective date.
The promulgation of this rule jolted the tobacco industry. It was
feared that if the rule were put into effect, vast segments of the economy
might be affected. The tobacco industry, a $10 billion business, reaches
every corner of the nation. More than $250 million annually is spent by
cigarette manufacturers on advertising alone. Twenty-one of the fifty
states derive a substantial portion of their income from the production
of tobacco; 700,000 farm families in these states are dependent upon
tobacco as a source of income. And, not least important, federal and state
cigarette taxes exceed $3.3 billion annually, accounting for a sizeable
percentage of all government revenue.210
205 FTC News Release, Jan. 11, 1964.
206 29 Fed. Reg. 530-32 (1964).
207 16 C.F.R. § 1.67(b) (1964).
208 N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1964, p. 13, col. 1; Id., Mar. 18, 1964, p. 1, col. 2;
Id., Mar. 19, 1964, p. 55, col. 2.
209 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964).
210 See, generally, Hearings on Cigarette Labeling and Advertising before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See also
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In previous years, the tobacco lobby, skillfully making the most of
these statistics, had succeeded in defeating all attempts to regulate the
advertising and sale of cigarettes. 1' This time, however, the political
climate had shifted, and it soon became clear that the industry could not
hope to escape completely unscathed.
The lobbyists, sensitive to the shift in the political climate, switched
their tactics. 12 They decided that outright nullification of the FTC
rule and Congressional inaction on the matter were too much to hope for.
Instead, a compromise was proposed: the industry would not oppose
labeling legislation (for packages) if Congress would agree to abrogate
the health warning in advertising.
To allow time for Congress to consider these proposals, a delay in the
effective date of the FTC rule-to July 1, 1965-was sought and se-
cured. 3 While this was being done, the industry announced the adoption
of a voluntary cigarette advertising code, designed to meet some of the
FTC's objections, and presumably providing evidence of the industry's
good faith and public conscience. 14 Then, by summoning the support of
southern Congressmen, and by fully utilizing the staggering economic
statistics, the tobacco proponents pleaded their cause. The strategy
worked, and Congress was persuaded to enact a weak labeling bill
as a substitute for the strong sanctions of the FTC rule. The result
Drew, "The Quiet Victory of the Cigarette Lobby," The Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 1965,
pp. 76-80 (1965).
211 Since 1962, a number of bills and resolutions have been introduced which would
have required, among other things, disclosure of filtration effectiveness, disclosure of
nicotine and tar content, and a warning label. See H.R. 10910, H.R. 12233, and S. 3366,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 3610, H.R. 4168, and H.R. 7476, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); H.R. 9693 and H.R. 9808, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). In addition, there were
proposals to make the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act applicable to cigarettes,
H.R. 11714, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), to empower the FTC to regulate the advertising
and labeling of cigarettes, H.R. 9655, H.R. 9657, and S. 2429, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964),
and generally, to control the health hazards involved in cigarette smoking, H.R. 11671,
11919, and S. 2430, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Opposition by the tobacco industry and
southern Congressmen doomed all of these efforts to failure.
212 For an excellent account of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering of the tobacco
lobbyists, and their highly organized assault on the FTC rule, see Drew, supra note 210.
213 29 Fed. Reg. 12626 (1964). Senator, Neuberger, an ardent foe of all attempts to
frustrate effective cigarette legislation, has strongly decried the political pressure that
brought about this delay. See 111 Cong. Rec. 706 (1965).
214 The code, which went into effect on January 1, 1965, bans any cigarette advertise-
ment which (a) is aimed at persons under 21, (b) contains unproved health claims, or
(c) employs a "virility" theme. The use of models under the age of 25-in either age or
appearance-is not permitted, and testimonials by famous athletes or entertainers may
not be used. Any advertisement which depicts smoking as "essential to social prominence,
distinction, success or sexual attraction" is outlawed by the code.
The code provides for an administrator whose function is to screen out objectionable
advertisements prior to publication. The administrator is empowered to fine violators
up to a maximum of $100,000.
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was the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,215 signed into
law on July 27, 1965.
A. The Federal Statute
The most significant feature of the new act is its requirement that, as
of January 1, 1966, all cigarette packages must bear a label warning of
the health hazard connected with smoking cigarettes. Each pack and
carton of cigarettes is required to prominently display the statement
Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous To Your Health2 10
Failure to comply is punishable by fine not to exceed $10,000. Under-
cutting this requirement, however, is the declaration that
No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in con-
formity with the provisions of this chapter. 217
The latter provision, which nullifies the FTC's trade regulation rule, is
scheduled to terminate on July 1, 1969.21' Thus, a moratorium of four
years (running from July 1, 1965, the date the FTC rule would have
been effective) has been imposed on any FTC efforts to regulate cigarette
advertising by requiring disclosure of the health hazard. The Commission
is free, of course, to pursue its traditional cease and desist remedy with
respect to any cigarette advertising practices which it finds to be unfair
or deceptive.219
The new law, representing as it does a resounding victory for the
tobacco industry, has not escaped criticism. It has been described as a
"shocking piece of special interest legislation," which "confers a favor on
one industry that all the other industries under the [Federal Trade] Com-
mission's jurisdiction would naturally like to have. 2 Of the moratorium
on FTC efforts, Senator Neuberger has wryly observed that "while Con-
gress can impose a moratorium on warning statements in advertising,
there will be no parallel moratorium on the deaths and disease caused
by smoking.
221
215 79 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 1965). The statute is set out in full in
the Appendix.
216 79 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (Supp. 1965). However, the statute does not
specify on which panel the warning label shall be affixed. As a result, the warning has
generally been placed on the side panel of the pack.
217 79 Stat. 28, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (Supp. 1965).
218 79 Stat. 284, 15 U.S.CA. § 1339 (Supp. 1965).
219 79 Stat. 28, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c) (Supp. 1965).
220 New York Times (editorial), July 9, 1965, p. 28, cols. 1-2.
221 S. Rep. 195, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1965). In addition, both the Department of
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At this early date, it is difficult to determine with any precision what
effect the package warning label will have. 2 ' Most authorities have pre-
dicted, though, that any reduction in cigarette smoking is likely to be
inconsequential at best. 3  Very early returns have begun to bear this
out. Statistics covering the first quarter. of 1966-a period in which the
warning might be expected to have its greatest impact-indicate no sig-
nificant change in current smoking trends .22  Thus, there appears to be
little hope that the new labeling law will have any significant effect in
curtailing smoking.3
A health warning in advertising, however, would be quite another
matter. Advertising has always been regarded as the backbone of the
industry. It was the chief factor in the phenomenal rise in cigarette pop-
ularity in the early part of the century,2 6 and in recent years it has
enabled the industry to placate smokers' fears in the face of mounting
medical evidence. Cigarette manufacturers have felt that as long as the
Congressional sanctuary for advertising remains in effect, continued
prosperity for the industry will be assured.2T
But if the advertising health warning is permitted to take effect, the
industry fears that its very survival will be at stake. By continuing to
advertise, in effect it will be telling the smoker, "Buy Brand X. They
may be harmful, but so what? A little cancer never hurt anybody."
Alternatively, the industry could drop its advertising altogether-a drastic
step in view of the key role advertising has played in the past.
It is not surprising, therefore, that any regulation of cigarette adver-
Commerce and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare have gone on record
in opposition to the advertising moratorium. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare
letter, H. Rep. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 13 (1965); Dep't of Commerce letter, H.
Rep. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965); Dep't of Commerce letter, S. Rep. 195, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
222 Congress has directed the FTC to submit a report on the effectiveness of the warning
label not later than July 1, 1967, and annually thereafter. 79 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1334(d)(2) (Supp. 1965).
223 The severest critic of the new legislation in the House has described the label as a
warning "in whispered tones" to smokers who are "already hooked." Remarks of Repre-
sentative Moss, 111 Cong. Rec. 15959 (1965).
Senator Neuberger has taken a similar position. With the warning label on the side
panel of the cigarette pack, she reasons, by the time the smoker has a chance to read
it he already has a cigarette in hand and is ready to light up. A warning in advertising
represents the only real chance of forestalling the threshold decision to buy cigarettes.
Senate Commerce Committee Report (Dissent), S. Rep. 195, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1965).
See also New York Times, July 9, 1965, p. 28, col. 1 (editorial); Id., Dec. 26, 1965, p. 1,
col. 8, p. 7, col. 2 (opinions expressed by individuals connected with the tobacco industry).
224 Internal Revenue Service, "Tobacco Tax Collections" (Monthly data, January, 1964-
March, 1966); U.S. Department of Agriculture, Tobacco Situation, March 30, 1966.
225 But the Department of Agriculture predicts a modicum of success. The department
believes that smoking may taper off by 1-201 over the next few years as a result of the
warning label. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1966, p. 9, col. 1.
226 See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra. See also Nicholls, Price Policies in the
Cigarette Industry 58-72 (1951).
227 Science, April 23, 1965, p. 478.
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tising has been regarded as an anathema by the cigarette industry.2 8 At
the same time, however, it is rapidly becoming clear that regulation and
control of cigarette advertising represents the only real hope for curbing
cigarette smoking through voluntary action of the consumer. To this end,
it seems inevitable that the FTC's strictures dealing with cigarette ad-
vertising will eventually have to be reinstated. When this occurs, the
FTC's authority to exercise substantive rule-making power will undoubt-
edly be challenged, and the courts will have to resolve the legal issues
thereby presented. We turn now to a consideration of these issues.
B. FTC Trade Regulation Rile
The basic authority for the Commission's trade regulation rule is de-
rived from Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 2 9
which declares unlawful "unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." It has been the
Commission's position that current cigarette advertising constitutes such
an unlawful practice, so long as it contains subtle health assurances230
without intimating that a serious health risk may be involved. Needless
to say, this position rests on the premise that cigarette smoking does
involve a serious health hazard. Rather than making an independent de
novo investigation into this question, the FTC decided231 to rely entirely
upon the conclusions of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee, which
it regarded as having primary jurisdiction 2 to determine the relationship
between cigarette smoking and health. Since the Advisory Committee,
a subdivision of the United States Public Health Service, had acted in a
formal governmental capacity,2 3 the FTC considered the findings of
the Smoking Report to be a proper basis for remedial action.
234
228 Drew, supra note 210, at 76; Science, supra note 227, at 478.
229 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (1958).
230 After reviewing current advertising practices, the Commission concluded: "[tihe
magnitude and pervasiveness of cigarette advertising are such that virtually all Americansi
including most children, are continually exposed to the portrayal of the desirability of
smoking and to assurances respecting the safety of healthfulness of cigarette smoking."
Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8348 (1964).
231 Id. at 8331.
232 The primary jurisdiction concept stems from the 1907 Supreme Court decision in
Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The doctrine arises
out of the desirability of having an administrative body, and not the courts, make the
determination of issues of fact that fall within its special field of expertise. "Preliminary
resort to the Commission is required ... because the enquiry is essentially one of fact and
of discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determination
is left to the Commission." Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285,
291 (1922) ; Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). See also 3 Davis,
Administrative Law § 19.01 (1958).
233 In this and other respects, the Smoking Report differs from the collected opinions
of an independent body of experts which would have to be weighed against one another
before a final determination could be made. Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325,
8331-32 (1964).
234 Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8331-32 (1964). Cf. James S. Kirk & Co.
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The validity of the trade regulation rule will depend on whether its
promulgation exceeds the power which Congress has vested in the Com-
mission. The ultimate answer to this question hinges upon three inter-
mediate questions: (1) If the traditional cease and desist procedure were
used, would current cigarette advertising practices constitute unfair or
deceptive acts? (2) If so, could the FTC lawfully frame its cease and
desist order to require the respondent to take affirmative steps to disclose
the health risk? (3) If the answers to questions (1) and (2) are affirma-
tive, may the Commission achieve the same result in a quasi-legislative
fashion, by promulgating a trade regulation rule, instead of acting through
the medium of ad hoc adjudication?
1. Cease and Desist Order
The cease and desist procedure is the usual route by which the FTC
takes action against unfair commercial practices.28 5 The procedure is
initiated by the issuance of a complaint. A date for the hearing is set, and
the charges are heard. If, after hearing full arguments on both sides, the
Commission finds that respondent's practices are violative of section
5(a) (1), an order requiring him to cease and desist such practices will
issue. The respondent, of course, can obtain review of the order in the
appropriate circuit court of appeals.
Ever since the 1934 landmark decision in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro.,
Inc.,236 the Commission has been accorded very broad discretion in deter-
mining what practices are "unfair" in violation of the Act. The Keppel
case involved penny candy manufacturers whose practice was to attract
purchasers-especially children-by offering a chance feature, such as
a pencil, ruler, or penny, as a prize. The FTC found this practice unfair
and ordered respondent to cease and desist using the promotional feature.
When the case reached the Supreme Court (the Commission having
been reversed en route by the Third Circuit"s?), the question of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction was squarely presented. Observing that the FTC
had been created for the avowed purpose of lodging the administrative
functions committed to it in "a body specially competent to deal with
them," the Supreme Court emphasized that the Commission's determi-
nation should be accorded weight and upheld its action.38
v. FTC, 59 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1932), a case where the court felt itself, as well as the FTC,
to be bound by the resolution of certain questions of fact in a report by the U.S. Bureau of
Standards.
235 The steps culminating in a cease and desist order are set out in § 5(b) of the
FTC Act, 52 Stat. 112 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
236 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
237 63 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1933).
238 Supra note 236, at 314.
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In Nationd Candy Co. v. FTCt this broad pwr of the Commission
was re-emphasized. The respondent was again a penny candy manufac-
turer, and the facts were very similar to those in KepftL In upholding the
cease and desist order, the court noted that the use of the chance feature
(gambling) was contrary to the established policy of the Federal Gov-
ernment. This alone constituted a sufficient basis for remedial action,
since "a method of competition which is contrary to the established public
policy of the United States is an unfair method of competition within the
intent and meaning of section S of the statute."'2
In the instant situation, the Public Health Service, an arm of the Fed-
eral Government, has declared that the continued distribution and sale
of cigarettes necessitates some form of remedial action. Hence, the Com-
aison would certainly be acting within its broad discretionary power
were it to declare the continuation of these practices, absent remedial
action, to be an unfair method of competition contrary to an established
public policy of the United StatesO4
However, this is not the sole ground upon which the Commission could
justify a cease and desist order. Section S also declares unlawful attempts
by the seller to deceive the consumer for the purpose of influencing his
buying choice 42 Accordingly, the Commission has a broad mandate to
move not only against positive misstatements, but against the use of
half-truths as well. The latter has long been recognized as a well-known
and highly successful form of deception. 4 3
The classic example of a half-truth came to light in a section S pro-
ceeding against P. Lorillard during the heyday of the Tar Derby.
Lorillard had been proclaiming that Old Golds were 'lowest in nicotine"
and "lowest in throat-irritating tars and resins." Technically, this was
true; tests had actually proven the average Old Gold cigarette to contain
less nicotine than other leading-brand cigarettes--by 1/177,187 of an
ounce. Experts testified, however, that such a difference was uisignificant
from a physiological standpoint." Accordingly, the Commission concluded
239 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1939).
240 Id. at 1006.
241 "In determining whether a proposed proceeding will be in the publc Interest the
CommsIon exercises a broad discretion." The sole proviso is that the public Interest
must be "specific and substantial" before the Commission may act. FTC v. Klesnar, 280
U.S. 19, 28 (1929). This requirement Is certainly satisfied here.
2 The broadening of the FTC stand&rd was the prodect of the Weele-Lea amend.
ments of 1938 which declared unlawful Ounfair or deceptive acts or pctices In com.
merce.' 52 Stat. 111 (1938), IS U.S.C. I 4S(a)(1) (1964). Tem amendments reflect the
act's underlying policy that competition does not justify dishonest practces, that the
doctrine of caveat emptor cannot be relied upon to protect the fraudulent purveyor of
goods. "Laws are made to protect the trusting as wen as the suspklous. FTC v. Standard
Educ. SocY 302 Us. 112, 116 (1937).
243 See Handler, "The Control of Fals Advertising Under the WherLea Act, 6
Law & Contemp. Prob. 91, 98-99 (1939).
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that Lorillard's representations were misleading and deceptive and di-
rected the cessation of all such advertising.2" Its order was affirmed by
the court of appeals:
To tell lcss than the whole truth is a well-known method of deception;
and he who deceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the
deception by relying upon the truthfulness per se of the partial truth by
which it has been accomplished.
In determining whether or not advertising is false or misleading within
the meaning of the statute, regard must be had, not to fine spun distinc-
tions and arguments that may be made in excuse, but to the effect which
it might reasonably be expected to have upon the general public. "
The FTC relied upon the Lorillard decision in a subsequent case in-
volving the Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. Chesterfield cigarettes had
been advertised as "Much Milder" than competing brands. When the
Commission charged deception, Liggett & Myers attempted to justify its
advertising by relying on the dictionary definition of mildness as denoting
a "moderate sensuous effect." The FTC rejected this argument, ruling
that fine-spun distinctions do not determine whether advertising is false
or misleading. The impression given to the general public was held to be
the determinative factor; here the Commission found that the term
"mild," when used in conjunction with health reassurances ("nose,
throat and accessory organs not adversely affected by smoking Chester-
fields"), implied that Chesterfields were less irritating than other brands.
Since there was no showing that Chesterfields were in fact less irritating,
the Commission directed the cessation of any further advertising along
these lines 46
On many other occasions throughout the 1940's and 1950's, the FTC
declared certain cigarette advertising practices to be unfair and deceptive
and issued the appropriate cease and desist orders.24T Not one of these
244 p. Lorilard Co., 46 F.T.C. 73S, modif.-d, 46 F.T.C. 853 (19s0).
245 p. Lorilard v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d S2, 58 (4t'-- Cr. 1930).
246 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., SS F.T.C. 3S41 378 (19S8).
247 The following constitutes a chronological acount of formal action by the FTC
during this period with respect to cigarette advertisug.
London Tobacco Co., 36 F.T.C. 282 (1943). Respondent used a crest simulating the
British Royal Coat of Arms to promote his product, thereby implying that his product
was a British Import. A cease and desist order issued compelling respondent to abandon
all implications that the product was British, including the London brand name and the
British crest.
R. L. Swain Tobacco Co., 41 F.T.C. 312 (1945). Advertisements for Pinehurst cigarettes
asserted that Pinehursts had been appro-ed and endorsed by the medical profession; that
they would soothe mouth, nose and throat, and that coughs and throat Irritation would
completely disappear ("Yes, sir, no cough, no wheeze, no throat Irritation when you smoke
Pinehurst Cigarettes"); that Pinehurst cigarettes would not produce stale room odors; and
that nicotine stains on fingers and teeth were consideraby less than those caused by other
brands. Upon Investigation, the Commission found all of these representations to be
untrue and ordered respondent to cese ar d desist from any further representations along
these lines.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 46 F.T.C. 706 (1950). modified. 192 F.2d 53S (7th CIr.
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orders has been disturbed. Nor does it seem that a similar order today,
directing the cessation of all cigarette advertising containing subtle
assurances of healthfulness, would be disturbed. The Commission has
determined, after a hearing in which all interested parties had an oppor-
tunity to present their views,2  that current advertising attempts to
persuade smokers that cigarette smoking is not harmful, and does in fact
create that impression.2 '* In the light of the wel-documented findings of
the Smoking Report, which the FTC has adopted, " the Commission
would be dearly warranted in finding that today's cigarette advertising is
no less deceptive (and far more insidious) than the advertisements which
prompted the cease and desist orders of the past two decades.
2. The Power to Require Affirmative Disdosure
The FTC Trade Regulation Rule is not merely aimed at directing the
cessation of health appeals in cigarette advertising. The rule goes further,
requiring tobacco manufacturers to take affirmative steps to disclose the
1951) modified order, 48 F.T.C. 682 (1952). Respondents advertisements represented thatCaM cigarettes wer capable of relieving bodily fatigue, encouraging digestion, and
soothing the nerves. In addition, it was asserted that Camels contained less nicotine that the
four other leading brands, and that consequently Camels would not Irritate the throat or
leave an aftertaste. The Commission found that these representations were false and mis-
leading and therefore deceptive, and issued an order compelling respondent to cea and
desist from these practices.
P. Lorlard Co., 46 F.T.C. 735 (19S0), modified 46 F.T.C. 853, a'd 186 F.2d 52 (4th
Cir. 1950) (discussed in text).
American Tobacco Co., 47 F.T.C. 1393 (1951). Advet ents for Lucky Strike cigarettes
stated that Luckes had achieved twice the popularity of any other brand among independent
tobacco experts (buyers, auctioneers and warehousemen). It was also chimed that Lucky
Strike contained less acid and less nicotine, and wzs less Irritating to the throat than other
leading brands. Investigation revealed that many of these so-called experts bad no con-
nection with the tobacco industry, and that most were completely unfamiliar with thegrades and qualities contained In Lucky Strike cigarettes. Large numbers of them were
not n fact exclusive smokers of Lucky Strike. Indeed, many of them had never smoked
at all Based on this information, the Commission concluded that the representations
which ad been made were "misleading and deceptive." As to the representations con-
cerning add and nicotine content, the Commission found no appreciable difference between
Lucky Strike and other leading brands. The appropriate orddr compelling respondent to
cease and desist from such practices was Issued.
Philip Morris & Co, 49 F.T.C. 703 (1952). The Commisson found lnsumdent evidence
supporting respondent's claim that the use of diethylene glycol rather than glycerine as
a molsturing agent n cigarettes minimized throat Irritation. A cease and desist order issued,
but was subsequently dismissed on a showing that respondent bad abandoned al ad
verthements that had been found to constitute unfair and deceptive practices.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co, 5S F.T.C. 354 (1958) (discussed In text).
Brown & Wilamson Tobacco Corp., S6 F.T.C. 956 (1960). Pursuant to a consent order
In accordance with I 3.25 of the Commisson's Rules of Practice and Procedure, respondent
agreed to cease and desist from the following advertisements In Its promotton of Life
cigarettes: 1) pictorial demonstrations purporting to prov that the filter Lued In Life
citrettes was capable of retaining all of the tars and nicotine contained in cpgrette amoke(Whch In fact It was not capable of doing); 2) representations that Life was endorsed by
the United States government (when in fact It was not); and 3) assertIoas that Ufa cip.
rettes were lower In tar and nicotine than other filter cigarettes.248 See note 208 supra and accompanying text.
249 Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 832., a346-43 (1964).
m Id. at 8331.
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health hazard inhering in their product. This is to be accomplished by
including a warning in all cigarette advertising.
In the past, the Commission's power to compel affirmative disclosure
has been upheld in a number of areas. Ironically, it was the Supreme
Court that first recommended that the FTC make use of such a power.
This occurred in a 1933 case, FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 1 where the use
of the affirmative disclosure requirement was suggested as a less drastic
alternative to an order compelling respondent to discontinue the use of
a trade name altogether. The respondents were in the business of mixing
and blending flour, but their trade name held them out as a "milling
company," thereby creating the false impression that they ground the
flour themselves. The Commission issued an order compelling respondents
to drop the words "milling company" from the trade name. The Supreme
Court thought this unnecessarily harsh, in view of the good will associated
with the name, and recommended an alternative:
The orders should go no further than is reasonably necessary to correct
,he evil and preserve the rights of competitors and public; and this can be
done, in the respect under consideration, by requiring proper qualifying
words to be used in immediate connection with the names .... This is a
matter which the Commission has not considered but which, as the body
having primary jurisdiction, it should, in the first instance, consider and
determine. And in doing so it will be enough if each respondent be re-
quired by modified order to accompany each use of the name or names
with an explicit representation that respondent is not a grinder of the
grain.... f
The agency has not been reluctant to heed the Royal Milling suggestion.
The courts, too, have been willing to grant the FTC extremely wide lati-
tude in choice of remedy. The agency's competence in choosing the ap-
propriate remedy is considered to fall within its special field of expertise,
in much the same manner as its ability to sit as trier of facts in a field
requiring specialized knowledge. "In striking that balance between the
conflicting interests involved which the remedy measures [the Commission
is] ... for all practical purposes supreme."-
The case which solidly established the Commission's competence to
require affirmative disclosure was Hillman Periodicals, Inc. v. FTC.25
There, the respondent's business consisted of reprinting abridged versions
of popular western and detective stories in paperback. Most of these
publications inv-olved substantial deletions from the original. To prevent
deception, the FTC ordered the publisher to take the affirmative step of
2ZI 288 US. 212 (1933).
252 Id. at 217-1g.
23 Henfield v. FTC, 140 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Ctr. 1944).
"4 44 F.T.C. 832 (194s), affd per curLm, 174 F2d 122 (9th Cir. 1949).
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placing the word "abridged" on the front cover of its books. In addition,
the publisher was directed to include in its advertising a notation that its
publications were abridged. The order was affirmed on appealO
Three significant aspects of Human are worth noting: (1) it involved
a respondent who had been guilty of making positive misrepresentations
(he had actually asserted that the books were unabridged); (2) the Com-
mission thought it necessary that positive steps be taken in order to erase
the false impression created in the public mind, even though respondent
had already discontinued his misrepresentations; and (3) placing the
word "abridged" on the books was not sufficient-a notation in adver-
tising was also required in order to stem deception.7" The situation of
the cigarette manufacturers is quite similar. In the past, their advertise-
ments have asserted that cigarettes are soothing to the throat, have no
adverse affects, and are generally of a beneficial nature.? While such
practices have indeed been discontinued, largely through the efforts of
the Federal Trade Commission, 4 the affirmative disclosure requirements
of the proposed FTC rule might well be thought necessary to erase the
impression that cigarettes are not harmful--an impression created by
constant pummeling over many years with misleading and deceptive
advertisements. And since advertising has been the vehicle used in the
past to convey this impression, the warning in advertising represents
the most effective means of dispelling it.
The need to dispel false impressions created in the past has justified
the affirmative disclosure power in a number of FTC cases. In Haskeite
Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, for example, a tray manufacturer had advertised
his product as made entirely of wood when in reality the surfaces were
composed of paper that simulated wood. The Commission ordered the
manufacturer to disclose the true content of his product. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the affirmative disclosure requirements im-
posed by the agency were "calculated to aid in dispelling for the future the
unfair and deceptive practices of the past... and they are well within the
power of the ... Commission. " Affirmative disclosure has frequently
been decreed in cases involving hazardous commodities. Where silver
255 Himan Periodicals, Inc., 44 F.T.C. 832 (1948), arid per curilam, 174 Fa2d 122 (9th
Cir. 1949).
256 Later cases Involving similar factual situations have resulted In Identical cease and
desist orders. See New American Library of World Literature, Inc. v. FTC, 213 F.2d 143
(2d Cir. 194); Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1960).
M See text preceding note 4, and note 247 supra.
25 See note 247 supra.
In 127 Fad 765 (7th Cir. 1942).
M Id. at 766. See also Theodore Kagen Corp. v. MlC, 283 Fi.d 371 (D.C. Cr. 1960)
(Manufacturer of watch cases simulating precious metal compeled to disclose the true
metal composition).
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polish containing 30 per cent carbon tetrachloride was marketed without
any indication that the fumes might be harmful, the manufacturer was com-
pelled to cease and desist from distributing his product unless purchasers
were effectively warned of the potential hazard 61 Similarly, a manufac-
turer of women's dresses made of highly flammable brushed rayon has
been compelled to attach tags to the garments, warning prospective
purchasers of the flammable character of the materialY These two lines
of decisions suggest that (1) where the public has been deceived in the
past as to the true nature of a product, or (2) where the product contains
a hazard that would not be immediately apparent to a casual purchaser,
the FTC does not ex'eed its statutory authority by prescribing the
disclosure necessary to apprise the consumer fully.2 3 Cigarettes ap-
parently fall into both of these categories. Thus, past precedent provides
persuasive support for the Commission's action compelling the tobacco
industry to affirmatively disclose the health hazard in cigarettes&2
There is, however, one counter-argument to the legitimacy of such an
assumption of power. In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Act amended the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Inter alia, the amendments declared unlawful
the dissemination of any false advertisement "for the purpose of inducing
... the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.""ae The definition
of "false advertisement" includes one which "fails to reveal facts material
in the light of such representations or material with respect to conse-
281 Rudolph R. Siebert, 49 F.T.C. 1418 (1953).
262 Academy Knitted Fabrics Corp., 49 F.T.C. 697 (19S2). See also Isidore Sandberg, 49
F.T.C. 1278 (1953); Albert H. Fisher, 49 F.T.C. 77 (1952).M63 Two other lines of cases have also typically given rise to affirmative disclosure orders.
The first line involves the so-called foreign origin cases, where an article imported from
abroad is sold here without any indication that it was not made in the United States. The
distributor has repeatedly been required to disclose the origin of the article. See Lucian V.
Sega], 34 F.T.C. 218 (1941), affd per curiam, 142 F.2d 25S (2d Cir. 1944) (lenses for
sunglasses made in Japan); L. Heller & Son, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 34 (19S3), aff'd, 191 F.2d
954 (7th Cir. 1951) (imitation pearls imported from abroad); American Tack Co, So
F.T.C. 202 (1953), afrd per curiam, 211 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1954) (Ehumbtacks imported from
Germany).
The other line of cases has concerned products that have been remade or reprocessed, and
subsequently resold with no indication of their second-hani nature. The distributor has
consistently been obliged to disclose that the merchandise he i3 selling is not new. See Jacob
Schachnow, 31 F.T.C. 1256 (1940), affd per curiam, CCH 19t'O-43 Trade Cas. 1 56,118 (3d
Cir. 1941) (remade hats); Royal Oil Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1292 (1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d 741(4th Cir. 1959) (reprocessed oil); Frank A. Kerran, 54 F.T.C. 1035 (1958), afld 265 F.2d
246 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959) (reprocessed oil).
264 At least one court has distinguished between "corrective" discosure-that which is
necessary to dispel deception, and disclosure which is merely "informative," and held that
the Commission's jurisdiction extends only to the former. Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 US. 818 (1950). Even so, in light of the flagrant health
claims of former years (e.g., "Do you inhale? What's there to be afraid of?"), the health
warning must be regarded as necessary to dispel past deception and untruths in cigarette
advertising, and as such, the Commission's rule would be a "corrective" measure within
the Alberty terminology. But see Comment, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 303, 306-09 (1964), for a
contrary view.
2d3 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § S2(a)(1) (1964).
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quences which may result from the use of the commodity .... 2' With
the enactment of these Wheeler-Lea amendments, Congress encouraged
the FTC to employ the affirmative disclosure remedy in order to dispel
misleading impressions and half-truths.
The fact that Congress thought it necessary to add these sanctions sug-
gests that prior to the Wheeler-Lea amendments in 1938, the Commission
may have lacked the power to require affirmative disclosure in advertise-
ments. Subsequent to 1938, the argument runs, the FTC would have the
power with respect to cigarette advertisements only if it could be shown
that cigarettes are one of the commodities specifically covered by the
Wheeler-Lea amendments--.e., a food, drug, device or a cosmetic.
The case of FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.267 is said to preclude
any such showing. In that case, the Commission brought suit in the district
court under section 13 of the amended act -68 to enjoin allegedly deceptive
claims by the manufacturer of Chesterfield cigarettes. To establish its
authority to employ the injunctive remedy, the FTC was required to
show that cigarettes were a "drug" as the term is defined in section
15 (c).269 The court dismissed the action, expressly holding that cigarettes
are not a "drug" within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.2 70
The Liggett & Myers case precludes any reliance on the Wheeler-Lea
provisions and forces the FTC to fall back on its general section 5 power
to justify affirmative disclosure. But the original premise was that sec-
tion 5 originally contained no power to require affirmative disclosure;
otherwise, Congress would not have thought it necessary to add that
power with respect to food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. It is said to
follow, therefore, that requiring cigarette advertising to disclose the
health hazard would be an unauthorized assumption of power by the
Commission.
This reasoning based on the Wheeler-Lea amendments and the Liggett
& Myers case is faulty in several respects. First, the Liggett & Myers
case was decided in 1953, a time when cigarettes were not generally
thought to be harmful, unless used in excess. In interpreting Wheeler-Lea,
an act avowedly aimed at protecting public health and welfare, the
Liggett & Myers court was of the opinion that the injunctive remedy for
"drugs" ought to be reserved for those products which might, in the
266 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1964).
267 108 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd mem., 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
268 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
269 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(c) (1964).
270 The Commission was thereupon left to pursue the traditional cease and desist remedy
under § 5 of the Act. Ultimately, the FTC prevailed by pursuing this much slower route.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 55 F.T.C. 354 (1958).
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course of moderate use, affect human health. In the light of today's
knowledge, however, the court might well have decided that it was within
the scope of the congressional purpose to include cigarettes as a "drug."
Indeed, for a modern court to hold otherwise might be contrary to the
basic spirit of the Wheeler-Lea amendments.
In addition, it should be noted that the Liggett & Myers decision in-
volved a suit for injunctive relief, while the present issue concerns the
power to compel affirmative disclosure. The power to seek affirmative
relief was clearly and explicitly added to the act in 1938 by the Wheeler-
Lea amendments; no provision in the act prior to that time could be
construed as giving the Commission that power. The affirmative disclosure
power, however, has been implicit in section 5 of the act from its incep-
tion. Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court in Royal Milling encouraged the
FTC to make use of the section 5 power for this purpose.2 71 Since 1938,
the Commission has on many occasions required affirmative disclosure
within the framework of a cease and desist order, and in every instance
its power has been derived from section 5 of the act.2 72 Thus, unlike the
injunctive power, which without Wheeler-Lea would not have existed,
the affirmative disclosure power has been implicitly contained in the act
since 1914 when section 5 was originally enacted. It is most likely that
Congress decided to make the power explicit with respect to foods, drugs,
cosmetics and devices in order to encourage the Commission to make the
fullest possible use of that power insofar as these commodities were con-
cerned. Hence, the Liggett & Myers case concerned an assumption of
FTC power that is quite different from the one involved here. This,
coupled with the fact that the decision was premised upon a factual
assumption subsequently proven invalid (that cigarettes are not par-
ticularly harmful) deprives any argument based on the Liggett & Myers
interpretation of Wheeler-Lea of much of its force.
Lastly, Wheeler-Lea was not solely concerned with food, drugs, cos-
metics and devices. In addition to sections 12-18 of the act (which dealt
solely with these commodities), 73 the amendments also broadened the
scope of section 5 by declaring unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices." 74 Decisions since the Wheeler-Lea amendments were enacted
have stressed the broadening of the Commission's section 5 power. They
give lie to the argument that the 1938 amendments implied a narrowing
271 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (See discussion in text accompanying
notes 251-53 supra.)
272 See notes 260-63 supra.
273 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-58 (1964).
274 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (1964).
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of the Commission's jurisdiction over deceptive advertising. In Fresh
Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC,2 75 one of the first cases that arose after
the passage of Wheeler-Lea, the court was clear on this issue:
The amendment to § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 of the Act did not modify
the term 'unfair methods of competition in commerce' but made unlawful
what were called "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,"
and by so doing enlarged instead of lessened the scope of the jurisdiction
of the Commission. The additions found in §§ 12 to 15, inclusive, were
also to give the Commission greater control over the advertising of food,
drugs, cosmetics and the like by providing for criminal action as well as
injunction; and only in proceedings under such sections is the definition
of false advertisment in § 15 relevant, not in a proceeding like this under§ 5.276
While the Fresh Grown Preserve case was not immediately concerned
with the affirmative disclosure power, its holding applies equally to that
area. This was made clear in Mary Muffet, Inc. v. FTC,277 a case in-
volving a manufacturer of ladies' dresses and blouses. The garments,
which resembled silk, were advertised as "crepe," but in fact they were
made of rayon. The FTC found that by such practices customers were
being deceived into believing that they were purchasing clothes made of
silk. To remedy the situation, the agency ordered the respondent to dis-
close to prospective purchasers the actual rayon content of the gar-
ments.2 7s On appeal, the Commission's order was affirmed. Relying on the
Fresh Grown Preserve holding, the court of appeals construed section 5
broadly, enactment of Wheeler-Lea notwithstanding:
[A]ffirmative disclosure in the advertising of foods, drugs, curative de-
vices and cosmetics, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 52, 55(a), [does] . . . not tie the
hands of the Commission from acting in the public interest in all other
cases.279
Thus, the courts seem primarily interested in ensuring that the FTC
be free to act to protect the public interest. Questionable theories of
statutory interpretation are not likely to be well received where they
would hamper the agency in achieving this goal. With the statutory
argument dismissed, there is ample precedent to support the Commission
in its endeavor to compel disclosure of the cigarette health hazard by the
tobacco industry. Any challenge to the Commission's affirmative disclosure
power is not likely to succeed.
275 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942).
276 Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917, 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
277 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952).
278 Mary Muffet, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 724 (1950).
279 Mary Muffet, Inc. v. F.T.C., 194 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Asheville
Fabrics, Inc., 49 F.T.C. 1190 (1953).
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3. Substantive Rule-Making Power of the Federal Trade Commission:
Does It Exist?280
In 1914, when Congress established the Federal Trade Commission for
the purpose of ferreting out unfair or anti-competitive business prac-
tices, the new Commission was regarded as essentially an adjudicatory
body, with little or no rulemaking power .28 For the most part, the Com-
mission has exercised its regulatory powers within that framework, de-
ciding each case on the particular facts presented and issuing an order
directing the cessation of any practice found to be unfair.
It soon became evident, though, that this procedure was not adequate
to deal with certain industry-wide practices, since repeated adjudications
involving identical facts not only were extremely cumbersome, but re-
sulted in considerable unfairness to all parties concerned. 82
Accordingly, the Commission early initiated the concept of the Trade
Practice Conference. 283 The conference is generally convened at the
instance of representatives of an industry, who wish to bring to the Com-
mission's attention particular practices within the industry. After a
hearing, the FTC expresses its views of the law applicable to the matter
in the form of a Trade Practice Rule. 84
280 This section considers the arguments pro and con bearing on this question, and
attempts to resolve them in the light of legislative history, judicial precedents, statutory
language and relevant policy considerations. At this point, however, a representative
sampling of the views expressed on this subject should be noted.
Those expressing the view that the FTC already has rulemaking power include: Cushman,
"The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions," in President's Comm. on
Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies 203, 230 (1937); MacIntyre, "Re-
solving Uncertainties Under our Antimonopoly Laws Through Administrativ6 Action," 14
Ad. L. Rev. 132, 143 (1961); The New York Times (editorial), N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1964,
§ 3, p. 10, col. 2; Elman, "Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the
Merger Law," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 385 (1964); Forte, "The Food and Drug Administration,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods," 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
860, 885-86 (1965). Those indicating that further legislation would be required include:
Hart, "The Exercise of Rule-making Power," in President's Comm. on Administrative
Management, Report with Special Studies 309, 332 (1937); House of Representatives
Select Committee on Small Business, Report, H.R. Rep. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31,
34 (1951) ("Study should be given to the possibility of granting the Commission a com-
prehensive rule-making power"); Surgeon General Luther L. Terry, Hearings on Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1964). For an ambivalent view, see Shapiro, "The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy," 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 921, 960-61 (1965).
281 See notes 296-98 infra and accompanying text.
282 For further elaboration, see text accompanying notes 323-28 infra.
283 The first such conference was held in 1919, and resulted in an elimination of certain
abuses in misbranding gold finger -rings. MacIntyre, supra note 80, at 138. Since that time,
the FTC has employed this procedure on a number of occasions, resulting in trade practice
rules covering a wide variety of industries, ranging from artificial limbs to yeast. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 18.1-227.201 (1960).
284 Lacking express authority for issuance of trade practice rules, the Commission has tra-
ditionally relied upon the vague grant of rulemaking power in § 6(g) of the Act. 38 Stat.
721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g). See Note, "The Federal Trade Commission and Reform of
the Administrative Process," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 67.1, 697-98 (1962).
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Trade Practice Rules are not intended as statements of existing law,
nor do they carry the force of law." 5 They are merely intended as guide-
lines for the industry. If the FTC does decide to prosecute a violator, the
complaint charges a violation of the underlying law, not of the Trade
Practice Rule." 6 In prosecuting the respondent, the FTC must prove de
novo the basic deception and unfairness that prompted the trade practice
rule; it cannot rely upon the rule itself to satisfy its burden of proof. For
example, if cigarette advertising were governed by a trade practice rule,
and a subsequent section 5 proceeding were brought alleging deceptive
advertising practices, the FTC would be required to prove de novo both
the causal link between cigarettes and health and the deception being
practiced on the consuming public.
In recent years, the use of the trade practice conference and the pro-
mulgation of trade practice rules has declined considerably. The inherent
limitation of these rules-that they lack the force of law-has hampered
their effectiveness, and the voluntary bonds between the FTC and a num-
ber of industries have begun to show signs of stress.28 7 To buttress the
Commission's effectiveness in enforcing compliance with the act, the FTC
decided to make use of the long-dormant substantive rulemaking power
in approaching the cigarette-health problem. The result was the trade
regulation rule 8
Unlike its trade practice counterpart, the trade regulation rule is de-
signed to have binding effect when applied to any matter within the
scope of the rule:
Where a trade regulation rule is relevant to any issue involved in an
adjudicative proceeding thereafter instituted the Commission may rely
upon the rule to resolve such issue, provided that the respondent shall
have been given a fair hearing on the legality and propriety of applying
the rule to the particular case.289
Hence, it is clearly contemplated that in subsequent adjudications, the
285 16 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1955) provides:
Trade practice rules are in the nature of advisory opinions for the guidance of
businessmen. Trade practice conference rules are designed to eliminate and prevent,
on a voluntary and industry-wide basis, trade practices and methods of competition
and business behavior in an industry which constitute violations of laws administered
by the Commission.
288 16 C.F.R. § 2,30 (1955) provides that:
Formal complaint proceedings involving practices which are violative of trade practice
rules charge violation of the statutory provision on which the rules are premised, and
do not charge violation of the trade practice rule.
287 See Note, supra note 284, at 698-700; Maclntyre, supra note 280, at 141.
288 The promulgation of the trade regulation rule governing the advertising and labeling
of cigarettes represents the first use of this power. Since the promulgation of the cigarette
rule the FTC has issued trade regulation rules covering the following products: sleeping
bags, binoculars, dry cell batteries, tablecloths, leather belts, used lubricating oil, and
television screens. Forte, supra note 280, at 886-87.
289 16 C.F.R. § 1.63(c) (1963).
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Commission will be entitled to rely on the factual conclusions and the
legal propositions contained in the trade regulation rule.290 The rule will
have the force of law, and must stand or fall as such." 1
It is necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the FTC possesses sub-
stantive rulemaking authority to support this exercise of power. At no
point in the act is the Commission expressly accorded substantive rule-
making power.192 To support such an exercise of power, the Commission
must rely upon the general grants of power contained in sections 5 and 6
of the act.293 The two relevant provisions are section 5 (a) (6) ,294 which
is a general expression of the Commission's power to prevent unfair or
deceptive practices, and section 6(g) ,2915 which couples a vague rule-
making power with the authority to classify corporations.
In interpreting these vague statutory provisions, the legislative history
of the Federal Trade Commission Act represents the one serious obstacle
to the Commission's assumption of rulemaking authority. When the bill
to establish the Trade Commission was reported back from the conference
committee, it was presented to the House by J. Harry Covington of
Maryland, the moving force behind the bill. In the course of his final
presentation he made the following explicit declaration:
The Federal Trade Commission will have no power to prescribe the
methods of competition to be used in the future. In issuing its orders it
will not be exercising power of a legislative nature . . . . The function
of the Federal Trade Commission will be to determine whether an exist-
ing method of competition is unfair, and if it finds it to be unfair, to
order the discontinuance of its use.2 96
During the course of the debate that followed the Covington speech,
analogies were frequently drawn between the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, at the time the only other comparable administrative body, and
the proposed Federal Trade Commission. Established in 1887, the ICC
had been given the power both to declare existing rates unreasonable, and
to prescribe just and reasonable rates for the future.29 7 The sponsors of
290 The FTC has stated that it intends to so rely. See Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8325, 8371-72 (1964).
291 MacIntyre, supra note 280, at 145-46; H.R. Rep. No. 3236, supra note 280, at 31.
Thus, the possibility of construing the rule as interpretive rather than legislative would
seem to be precluded. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 5.03 (1958).
292 There is one exception which, however, is not relevant here. In the Wool Products
Labeling Act, the FTC has authority to prescribe substantive rules with respect to label
disclosure requirements. 54 Stat. 1131 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68d (a) (1964).
293 For an analysis of the specific statutory provisions, see text accompanying notes 307-14
infra.
294 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1964). The statutory language is set
out in note 308 infra.
295 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (g) (1964). See text accompanying note 307 infra.
296 51 Cong. Rec. 14932 (1914).
297 36 Stat. 551 (1910), 49 U.S.C. § 15(l) (1964).
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the Trade Commission bill were careful to assure their brethren that the
proposed FTC would only possess powers of the first type, and would
not have the authority to prescribe conduct for the future. Representative
F. C. Stevens of Minnesota, one of the five House managers of the bill,
was emphatic on this point when questioned during debate:
Mr. SHERLEY [Ky.]. If the gentlemen will permit, the Federal trade
commission differs from the Interstate Commerce Commission in that it
has no affirmative power to say what shall be done in the future?
Mr. STEVENS of Minnesota. Certainly.
Mr. SERLraEy. In other words, it exercises in no sense a legislative
function such as is exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission?
Mr. STvNs of Minnesota. Yes. The gentleman is entirely right.
We desired clearly to exclude that authority from the power of the Com-
mission.m 8
On its face, the legislative history seems dispositive on the issue of
the agency's rulemaking power. But this is hardly the case. There are
several reasons why this legislative history should not be heavily relied
upon to dispose of this issue.
First, the history itself contains internal inconsistencies. Representative
Stevens, for example, probably did not intend his remarks to be too
heavily relied upon. This seems apparent from his general conception of
the Commission's power as revealed in another statement:
This measure, for the first time in this country, attempts an adminis-
trative regulation of commerce itself. We have regulated the instrumen-
talities such as transportation and finance, but here we attempt to rule
and help commerce. An executive alone with power of enforcement merely,
or even a wise discretion, could not do it. The courts under their ruling
could not wisely and liberally accomplish the needed results. The legis-
lative branch can only prescribe rules for the future. It requires a
combination of all those powers in one organization, with the highest
obtainable talent well and thoroughly to work out the difficult problems
which will be met.299
Also, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce evidently had a
somewhat different view of the Commission than the House sponsors did.
According to the report that followed hearings on the bill, the Senate
Committee desired to accord the new agency wide discretion in filling in
the gaps of the enabling act:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether
it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which
prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would,
by a general declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the
298 51 Cong. Rec. 14938 (1914).
299 5 Cong. Rec. 14939 (1914). [Emphasis added.]
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commission to determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that
the latter course would be the better . . . .s0o
Although the Committee probably had in mind gap-filling through a
series of successive adjudications, its statement need not be limited to
the ad hoc approach. It does not seem likely that the Committee intended
to force the Commission, when presented with an industry-wide problem
such as the cigarette hazard, to choose between the cumbersome case-by-
case approach and a complete abdication of its responsibility. Rather, the
Committee may well have expected the Commission to expedite such
matters in the most feasible and efficient manner-through a prospective
interpretation of "unfair and deceptive acts and practices" as applied to
the entire cigarette industry.
Second, much of this history has been rendered obsolete by subsequent
developments. Representative Covington's statement that the Commission
would have no power "to prescribe the methods of competition to be used
in the future" has been weakened considerably by the section 5 cases
explicitly upholding the Commission's power to require affirmative
disclosures3 0 1 The courts which have allowed the Commission to utilize
such powers do not seem to have been greatly troubled by the
Congressional debates; similarly, there appears to be little reason why
they should trouble a court passing upon the validity of the substantive
rulemaking power.
Third, it should be kept in mind that Congress in 1914 was still con-
cerned with the possibility that a delegation of legislative power to an
administrative agency might be declared unconstitutional. Any concern
along these lines dissipated with the cases of United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op, Inc., 02 and Yakus v. United States,03 which established the
Supreme Court's liberal policy toward delegation of legislative power.
Today no one would seriously question whether Congress could consti-
tutionally delegate to the Commission the power to prescribe unfair
methods of competition for the future, so long as it provided some
minimum guidelines. But this was not clear to the Congress of 1914, and
the statements by Representatives Covington and Stevens may simply
have been attempts to allay the fears of their colleagues as to the con-
stitutionality of the proposed act.
Fourth, a number of courts and authorities have suggested that it is
generally unwise to rely heavily upon legislative history.30 They argue
300 S. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
301 See text accompanying notes 251-79 supra.
302 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
303 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
804 See, e.g., Soon ERing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1885); Schwegmann Bros. v.
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that the expression of opinion by a few individuals during floor debate
does not accurately reflect the intent of the legislature as a whole, and
point out that the use of legislative history simply reintroduces the
policy controversies that were presumably resolved by the legislature
when it enacted the statute in its final form. The legislature is expected
to discard those policies to which it does not adhere, reduce the remaining
policies to an agreed formula, and enact a formal written expression of
its intent. It is this written expression that receives the formal approval
of the executive and then comes to the attention of the general public.
Hence, the use of internal legislative debates to interpret a statute is a
questionable practice and ought to be avoided where possible. 05
None of this is meant to suggest that the courts should entirely over-
look the debates surrounding the passage of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act-and particularly the statements made by Representatives
Covington and Stevens to the floor of the House. Indeed, it has generally
been recognized that if legislative history is to be considered at all,
explanatory statements by the sponsors of the bill are considerably
more reliable than mere floor debates, committee hearings, and the
like.8°6 But the reasoning above does suggest that this history should not
be dispositive on the issue of rulemaking power. Other factors-statutory
analysis, judicial precedents, and policy considerations-bear on the
issue, and must be examined.
(a) Statutory Analysis. Section 6 (g) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act provides:
The Commission shall also have the power-
(g) From time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and
regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of sections
41-46 and 47-58 of this title.307
The FTC relies upon a literal reading of section 6(g) as statutory
authority for its trade regulation rule. 08 But before one can be persuaded
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951) (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Jackson); Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47 Colum. L. Rev.
527 (1947). ("Spurious use of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as
to give point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the
statute." Id. at 543.)
305 Jackson, "Problems of Statutory Interpretation," 8 F.R.D. 121, 124-25 (1948).
306 See Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); United States v. Coca
Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281-83 (1916); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 (1904);
Jones, "Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts," 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737, 743-50 (1940).
307 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964).
308 Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8369 (1964). The FTC also relies upon
the general expression of authority in § 5(a) (6) of the act:
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships or
corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
1966]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
to adopt a literal reading, two potential obstacles are presented: (1) Does
the rulemaking power relate solely to the classification of corporations,
or is it broader in scope?; (2) Even if not limited to the classification of
corporations, is the rulemaking power limited to regulations of a proce-
dural character?
(1) The legislative history of section 6(g) is clearer and therefore
more helpful than is the previously discussed general legislative history of
the act. It indicates that the power to make rules and regulations is
separate and distinct from the power to classify corporations, and is not
narrowed or limited by it. In contrast to the corporation clause, which
was a much-discussed provision in both houses of Congress,309 the rule-
making clause was inserted into the act at the last minute. It was not
contained in any of the original bills, or in either the House or the
Senate draft; it was only appended to the list of general section 6 powers
when the final draft was before the Conference Committee. Since sub-
section (g) (containing the corporation power) happened to be the last
of the clauses in section 6, the authority to promulgate rules was simply
annexed at that point. The proximity between the grants of power is
therefore fortuitous, and no reason exists for permitting the corporation
clause to limit or narrow the Commission's authority to make rules.
(2) Nor is the Commission's section 6(g) power limited to rules of a
procedural character. Past decisions involving its use have upheld the
Commission's power to promulgate rules having the force and effect of
law. °10 Although these decisions all have involved rules of a procedural
character, 11 they in no way suggest that section 6 (g) is so limited31  This,
after all, is the first instance in which section 6(g) has been relied upon
to support a substantive FTC rule; an FTC case involving the use of
a substantive rulemaking power is yet to be presented to the courts. The
statute is not expressly limited to procedural regulation, and nothing in
the act or in its underlying purposes suggests such a limitation 13 To
read one in now would not only contravene the literal statutory language,
but seems to be at cross-purposes with the very goals the act was designed
to effectuate.3 14
309 S. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1914); H.R. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1914).
810 Hill v. FTC, 124 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1941).
811 In addition to Hill v. FTC, ibid, see, e.g., Hunt Foods & Indus. v. FTC, 286 F.2d
803, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 877 (1961); Kritzik v. FTC, 125 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1942).
312 A semantic argument might lay stress on the procedural connotations of the words
"carrying out" in § 6(g). But it seems unlikely that such an argument would be entitled
to very much weight.
313 MacIntyre, supra note 280, at 142.
314 A related issue and its resolution may be relevant here. A perusal of the entire
Federal Trade Commission Act reveals only one other instance where Congress employed
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(b) Judicial Precedents. The courts have repeatedly held that the FTC
has very broad discretion in framing remedies. This was well stated re-
cently by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is neces-
sary to eliminate the unfair and deceptive practices disclosed by the
record, and it has wide latitude for judgment. Shaping a remedy is
essentially an administrative function. Congress has entrusted the Com-
mission with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving a
statutory policy--the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter
for administrative competence . . . . Only in cases where the remedy
selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to
exist should a reviewing court interfere. 15
While it is true that this case, and most of the cases adopting a similar
viewpoint, were concerned primarily with agency action within the
framework of the traditional cease and desist procedure,81 6 these state-
ments are not limited to that procedure."1 As long as the remedy bears
a "reasonable relation to the unlawful practices" and is not flagrantly
lacking in statutory justification, the courts have upheld the Commission's
action. In fact, where broad prospective action is clearly the more rea-
sonable solution, courts have expressed a distinct preference for the
legislative approach3 18 In the light of the courts' willingness to grant the
FTC such wide latitude in framing the remedy, it would seem to make
sense to read the statute broadly and thereby allow the agency to carry
out its responsibilities in the most efficient possible manner 19
The Supreme Court has occasionally alluded to the quasi-legislative
language similar to that contained in § 6(g). In § 9 of the act, 15 US.C. § 49, the FTC is
granted the power "for the purposes of §§ 41-46 and 47-58 of this title" to compel by
subpoena the production of any documentary evidence relevant to any investigation con-
ducted by the Commission. In FTC v. Menzies, 145 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd,
242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957), the Commission had employed its subpoena power in con-
nection with an action to enforce § 2 of the Clayton Act. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
observed that although § 9 does not specifically extend the subpoena power to enforcement
of the Clayton Act, the Commission would be severely hampered in carrying out its re-
sponsibilities if the subpoena power were not liberally interpreted. The broad purposes
of the act, coupled with the unlimited language in § 9, compelled the court to uphold the
FTC action.
815 Carter Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 498 (9th Cir. 1959). [Emphasis by the
Court.]
316 See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); Hllman Periodicals, Inc.
v. FTC, 174 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1949).
317 "The Trade Commission Act is one of several in which Congress, to make its policy
effective, has relied upon the initiative of administrative officials and the flexibility of the
administrative process." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 33& U.S. 632, 640 (1950).
818 Witness the long Chenery litigation, where the Supreme Court repeatedly failed in
its efforts to encourage the SEC to make use of its rulemaking power. "[The choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency. SEC v. Chenery, 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
819 Handler, "The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False Advertising,"
31 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 550-51 (1931).
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power of the Commission. In FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,320 it elaborated upon
this concept. The FTC had issued an order compelling respondent to
cease and desist from certain price discriminations. Although every in-
stance of discrimination had involved a price differential in excess of 5 per
cent, the order was promulgated in such a form as to prohibit any and all
price differentials in the future. By encompassing price differentials
below the 5 per cent level, the order went considerably beyond the facts
of the case. Over respondent's objection that the Commission had gone
too far, the Court upheld the agency ruling. Significantly, the Court did
not question the Commission's power to frame an order with a scope
broader than the facts at issue.
The dissent by Justice Jackson was particularly illuminating. It was
his position that the Commission had not only the power, but the duty,
to promulgate rules in order to fill in the statutory gaps left by the
legislature. Jackson would have remanded to the agency in order to obtain
a clearer and more explicit statement on the conduct to be required in
the future. In a significant essay on the powers of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, the Justice was highly critical of the agency for failing to make
fuller use of its quasi-legislative authority:
It may help clarify the proper administrative function in such cases to
think of the legislation as unfinished law which the administrative body
must complete before it is ready for application. In a very real sense the
legislation does not bring to a close the making of the law . . . . Such
legislation represents inchoate law in the sense that it does not lay down
rules which call for immediate compliance on pain of punishment by
judicial process. The intervention of another authority must mature
and perfect an effective rule of conduct before one is subject to coercion.
The statute, in order to rule any individual case, requires an additional
exercise of discretion and that last touch of selection which neither the
primary legislator nor the reviewing court can supply. The only reason
for the intervention of an administrative body is to exercise a grant of
unexpended legislative power to weigh what the legislature wants weighed,
to reduce conflicting abstract policies to a concrete net remainder of
duty or right. Then, and then only, do we have a completed expression of
legislative will, in an administrative order which we may call a sort of
secondary legislation, ready to be enforced by the courts.32'
The fact that this essay appeared in a dissent should in no way suggest
that this is a renegade position. Justice Jackson's disagreement with the
majority centered upon the agency's duty, not its power. In fact, Jackson
was merely reflecting a position that a majority of the Court had taken
somewhat earlier:
320 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
821 F.T.C. v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
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The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute
in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed ... In
administering the provisions of the statute in respect of "unfair methods
of competition"--that is to say in filling in and administering the details
embodied by that general standard-the Commission acts in part quasi-
legislatively and in part quasi-judicially. 822
In light of these views, it seems reasonable to argue that the Commis-
sion's power to control conduct prospectively does not exist solely within
the adjudicatory framework, but rather extends to control through sub-
stantive rulemaking of general applicability.
(c) Policy Considerations. Where a decree of general applicability is
called for, as it is here, policy considerations overwhelmingly favor the
formal rulemaking approach over ad hoc adjudication which results in a
quasi-legislative decree.323 An adjudicatory proceeding resulting in a
quasi-legislative decree is initially far less valuable as a guide to future
conduct than a formal rule. Businessmen who find themselves in the "gray
area" on the outer edge of an adjudicated decree are more likely to con-
tinue their conduct in the hope that the decree will be strictly confined
to the facts of the particular case that spawned it. Repeated violations
and prosecutions will be necessary to apprise would-be violators of the
scope of the new policy; only then will it become of significant value
as a guide to future conduct. Formal rulemaking, providing a workable
guide to conduct, can avoid this problem3 2
In addition, there may be a sacrifice of private interests if one particular
adversary proceeding is used as a vehicle for promulgation of broad
prospective policy. The agency is likely to devote its attention to the
more encompassing task at hand, and in doing so it may place less
emphasis on the primary interests of the parties themselves. Moreover,
the particular company that happens to be the respondent when the
322 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). This language has been
used to support the thesis that § 6(g)'s rulemaking authority should receive a liberal con-
struction. MacIntyre, supra note 280, at 142-43.
323 The FTC Telies heavily upon these considerations in support of its trade regulation
rule. Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8366-68 (1964).
324 Peck, "The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board,"
70 Yale LJ. 729, 759 (1961).
One member of the President's Committee on Administrative Management was of the
view that this consideration ought to be dispositive:
If policies for the guidance of individual conduct are to be determined by regulatory
bodies it is desirable that such policies be embodied increasingly in carefully drawn
rules that all may read and understand, rather than being pricked out point by point in
ad hoc decisions. There is growing feeling, for example, that the law of unfair compe-
tition ought to be formulated in rules by the Federal Trade Commission, rather than
being pieced together out of a long series of individual cease and desist orders.
Cushman, supra note 280, at 230.
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agency decides to frame its decree will suffer more than its competitors,
since the latter will not be compelled to alter their practices until the
Commission also takes action against them. The rulemaking approach
assures that the entire industry will feel the weight of the FTC sanction
at the same time 25
Perhaps more important, there is a sacrifice of the public interest as
well. The use of adjudication to promulgate prospective decrees of
broad applicability deprives the various parties interested in the scope
of the decree of an opportunity to present their views. Of course, amicus
briefs may always be filed, but this does not approach the degree of
public participation that would be afforded by an open hearing for a
proposed rule. At such a hearing, the proposed rule could be subjected
to thorough criticism and analysis, with undesirable and unforeseen
consequences brought to light. This procedure is required for all rule-
making by section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .326 It
is even possible that an attempt by the agency to promulgate a broad
prospective decree within the adjudicatory framework might constitute
a violation of the APA 27
Last, traditional factors that might influence an agency to act through
adjudication are absent here. 28 This is not a unique or specialized situ-
ation that is incapable of solution through a general approach. Nor does
the agency have a need to accumulate experience before attempting to
arrive at a generalized solution. The FTC has had a long history of
dealing with cigarette advertisements and is well qualified to promulgate
a rule applicable to the entire industry.
Uniformly, these policy considerations favor the legislative approach
over a series of ad hoc adjudications. While standing alone, they are
certainly not dispositive; when considered in conjunction with the
statutory analysis and judicial precedents set out above, these policy
considerations could well serve as a makeweight in persuading a court
to uphold the FTC rule.
Although Congress has temporarily deprived the Commission of
authority to issue prescriptive regulations covering cigarette advertising,32
it is gradually becoming clear that some action in this area will be neces-
sary if consumers are to be convinced to give up smoking and current
825 Baker, "Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Wbich Should It Be?" 22 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 658 (1957).
826 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1964).
827 Peck, supra note 324, at 754-57.
828 Baker, supra note 325, at 661-65.
829 Congress has explicitly stated that the moratorium shall have no bearing on the
Commission's rulemaking authority. 79 Stat. 283, 284 (1965), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c), 1339
(Supp. 1965).
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trends are to be reversed. Since the FTC would undoubtedly be respon-
sible for the enforcement of any action that is ultimately taken, it would
seem that the Commission should frame the regulation to begin with. In
the final analysis, though, it is of little significance whether public
regulation-particularly control of cigarette advertising-is accomplished
through congressional legislation or FTC regulation, as long as effective
governmental action is taken to cope with the problem.
V
CONCLUSION
The American public is currently being exposed to a health hazard of
very significant proportions. It has been estimated that more than
125,000 Americans will die annually from the effects of cigarette
smoking if the current rate of consumption continues 30 A system of
public regulation represents the only sensible approach to a problem of
this magnitude. Such a system avoids the arbitrariness inherent in any
self-help remedy whereby the individual smoker seeks recourse against
a particular cigarette manufacturer. Public regulation, by establishing
a sanction of general applicability, endeavors to achieve an even-handed
solution to the problem.
The cigarette labeling legislation' enacted by 'Congress last year
represents a substantial step in the right direction. The significance of
the warning label lies in its psychological effect upon the smoker. With
every pack of cigarettes, he is informed and reminded of the risk to
his health. The causal link between cigarettes and lung cancer should
no longer have the status of debate in his mind. As long as causation
remained debatable, a smoker was able to convince himself that the
existence of any link was still tenuous, and that there would always be
time to stop when the link was conclusively shown to exist. The warning
on packages has upset this psychological status quo and compels the
smoker to accept the truth.331
The principal fault of the new legislation is that its effectiveness is
limited. By the time the smoker has a chance to read the warning label
on the side panel of the cigarette pack, he already has a cigarette in
hand and is ready to light up. A warning label in advertising copy would
330 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
331 This argument was used by Senator Magnuson in introducing his proposed "Federal
Cigarette Labeling Act" (S. 559) to the 89th Congress. He stressed that the bill was essen-
tial because the public had failed to accept the seriousness of the risk. "Too many are still
tempted to say, 'If cigarettes were really so harmful, the Government would certainly do
something about it.'" 111 Cong. Rec. 716 (1965). See also Consumers Union Report 204.
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overcome this difficulty.! Such a warning, by undermining the smoking
inducements of cigarette advertisements, affords the smoker an op-
portunity to strengthen any motivation he may have to refrain from
smoking.3m
Nevertheless, the FTC regulaticn of advertising must not be viewed
as a panacea. The confirmed smoker would undoubtedly continue to
smoke despite a warning in advertisements:14 The hope is that he can be
convinced to cut down. Furthermore, the advertising regulation provides
a good chance of convincing the moderate smoker to stop altogether.
The likelihood of accomplishing these goals can be measurably increased
if smokers are made aware that the damage is reversible as long as
invasive cancer has not actually developed.ss Many smokers understand-
ably take the attitude: "I've smoked for many years, and the damage
has already been done. Why stop now?"
By far the brightest hopes are for the younger generation on the verge
of smoking. It is hoped that cigarette regulation will prevent the habit
from taking hold in the first place. The proportion of nonsmokers would
thereby increase as each succeeding generation attains smoking age. As
increasing numbers of smokers give up the habit, the aura of social
desirability which today surrounds smoking should gradually disappear.
The ultimate goal is a return to the view-widely prevalent in this country
at the turn of the century-that smoking is socially unacceptable.
Through massive advertising campaigns, the tobacco industry was able to
bring about a complete reversal of this social attitude in a relatively
short period of time.tm There is no apparent reason why a similar
reversal could not be effected today. The full circle would thereby be
traversed; cigarette smoking would be left for the small minority who,
lacking any social compulsion to smoke, would do so because they found
the psychological satisfaction worth more than the heavy risks they know-
ingly choose to run.
The warning label also has a significant effect on the other remedy we
have considered: individual tort suits. By apprising the average smoker of
the risks involved, and by enabling him to make a conscious and
knowledgeable decision whether to smoke, the warning provides the
tobacco companies with a defense based on assumption of the risk. If
852 Senator Neuberger has expressed this view. Senate Committee Report (Dissent), S.
Rep. 195, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (196S).
a33 Science, April 23, 1965, p. 478.
34 However, nothing short of outright prohibition would be effective in his case, and
this would be a most undesirable solution. See part (c), infra.
M5 Auerbach, Stout, Hammond & Garfinkel, "Bronchial Epithelium in Former Smokers,"
New Eng. J. Med., July 19, 1962, p. 119, 124.
as See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
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the smoker chooses to continue, there is no inequity in barring recovery
for any injury that ensues.
Assumption of the risk, however, cannot apply to the tort suits of the
present day, since most of the plaintiff's smoking occurred before he
knew of the risk involved. Nevertheless, manufacturers can still escape
liability on some fault-substitute theory unless the courts take a farsighted
approach and impose strict enterprise liability. To do so, however,
would open the gates to such a flood of recoveries (at its most extreme,
manufacturers would have to make compensation for the 125,000 deaths
each year allegedly due to smoking) that it is almost inconceivable that
such claims would be allowed.
In addition to private tort suits, solutions most frequently suggested
to augment or supplant public regulation are: (1) taxation; (2) counter-
advertising and education; and (3) outright prohibition.
1. Taxation. It has been suggested that smoking might be discouraged
through the use of increased state and federal cigarette taxes, which place
a heavier economic burden upon those who wish to smoke. Today the
total tax on an average pack sold in the United States accounts for better
than half the retail price. Although high, this is considerably lower than
the tax burden in many of the European countries; in Great Britain 79
per cent of the average 55 cent retail price is due to taxes, while in
Denmark and Sweden a tax in excess of 80 per cent is levied on the retail
price. If taxes at comparable rates were imposed in the United States, the
price of cigarettes would increase to more than 70 cents a pack.3 "
However, it is quite probable that any attempt to use taxation to dis-
courage smoking would prove unsuccessful. Economists have shown that
the demand for cigarettes is a rather inelastic one and does not react very
significantly to price variations.38 This has been borne out in Great
Britain, where despite the high retail price there has been no significant
drop in the smoking level.3 9
More important, imposing a tax for the purpose of deliberately raising
the price could backfire and actually increase the adverse health effects.
With higher priced cigarettes, Americans would be likely to react as their
British counterparts have and smoke each cigarette down to the butt.
The consequence would be a much heavier dosage of carcinogenic ele-
ments.340 Thus, public health might actually be impaired if the increased
price were to induce a change in smoking habits.
337 Consumers Union Report 181.
338 Nicholls, Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry 85, 122, 183-5 (1951).
339 Consumers Union Report 182.
340 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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To obviate these objections, a system of selective taxation has been
proposed. Under this system, the rate of tax would be made proportional
to the amount of tar and nicotine released by the smoke, as determined by
some standard measure. Such a system might very well influence the
public to purchase less harmful cigarettes by placing brands containing
large amounts of nicotine and tars at a competitive disadvantage. 4'
2. Counter-Advertising and Education. In an attempt to fight fire with
fire, a program of counter-advertising has been considered. Such a pro-
gram has been under way in Great Britain since the publication of the
Royal College of Physicians report in March, 196242 Signs have been
posted in conspicuous places with the admonition: "Before you smoke,
think. Cigarettes cause lung cancer," and are signed by the Ministry of
Health. The Soviet Union, Denmark, and other countries have instituted
similar programs which also make use of graphic posters. 43 While it is
unlikely that counter-advertising alone would curtail smoking to any
substantial degree, such a concerted program could supplement enforce-
ment of other measures by convincing the American public of the neces-
sity for these measures.
Closely related to counter-advertising would be a program of education
aimed at individual attitudes toward smoking. The American Cancer
Society has been in the forefront of a campaign in this country to inform
the public of the health hazards connected with cigarette smoking. Since
1954, the Society has distributed more than 3.5 million copies of the
educational pamphlet "To Smoke or Not to Smoke." It has also sponsored
frequent radio and television announcements, and has been responsible
for numerous newspaper and magazine releases.344 Educational measures
of this type are aimed at influencing the ultimate decision by each indi-
vidual whether or not to smoke. In this respect, these efforts represent an
attempt to achieve a solution by attacking the very core of the problem.
In the past, the public has been only temporarily influenced by the
publication of reports linking cigarette smoking with- health hazards.
When the first reports were published in the early 1950's suggesting a
connection between smoking and lung cancer, a decline of 8.8 per cent
in the per capita consumption of cigarettes ensued. The reaction was far
from momentary; the recession in cigarette consumption lasted for nearly
six years. But ultimately the reaction proved to be temporary, and by
341 Consumers Union Report 183.
342 Royal College of Physicians of London, Smoking and Health (1962).
343 Consumers Union Report 172.
344 Id. at 198.
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1958 per capita consumption was higher than the 1952 figure. It has
risen steadily since then. 45 In 1964, after the publication of the Surgeon
General's report, another decline in consumption occurred. This time,
however, the smokers apparently were far better braced for the shock.
The decline proved to be much more temporary, and by the end of the
year, the level of consumption was higher than ever 3 46
Clearly then, counter-advertising and education alone are insufficient
to solve the problem on any permanent basis. If any lasting solution is
to be achieved, these methods should be keyed in with strict controls
of cigarette advertising and labeling.
3. Outright Prohibition. For many reasons outright prohibition would
be an undesirable solution. First, the enforcement of such a solution
presents practical difficulties. In our one previous experiment with
prohibition of a popular commodity on a national scale, efforts at enforce-
ment were unsuccessful. The gangsterism and underworld rackets that
developed during liquor prohibition created enforcement headaches in
other areas of the law as well, and today many of the remnants are still
with us. There is no reason to believe that an outright prohibition on the
sale and distribution of cigarettes would lead to any different result.
Second, tobacco must be distinguished from other physically harmful
commodities such as narcotics, where prohibition is the accepted mode of
control. Narcotics are harmful not only to the addict, but also to the
segment of the population with which he comes into contact. The addict
often steals or kills, or commits other socially undesirable acts in his
quest for narcotics. Moreover, since narcotics addiction generally results
in some form of incapacitation, society is deprived of any contribution
the narcotics user might otherwise make. Cigarettes, on the other hand,
affect only the individual who uses them, and do not incapacitate him or
in any way render him a less productive member of society.
347
345
Per Capita Per Capita
Consumption Consumption
Year (Ages 18 and over) Year (Ages 18 and over)
1950 3522 1957 3751
1951 3743 1958 3949
1952 3884 1959 4071
1953 3702 1960 4172
1954 3544 1961 4266
1955 3595 1962 4265
1956 3647 1963 4345
Statement of FTC Basis, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8334 (1964).
346 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
347 It might be suggested that cigarettes shorten the potential life span, and that the
number of years of useful contribution is thereby lessened. But the interest of society in
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Third, the effect upon the economy cannot be ignored. The tobacco
industry is a gigantic business, affecting large segments of the economy8 48
If cigarette manufacturing were prohibited, the monetary flow generated
by the industry would be abruptly shut off, almost certainly creating a
serious economic tremor. Unquestionably, this tremor would be cushioned
considerably if cigarette smoking were encouraged to taper off gradually.
This would also give the tobacco companies time to complete the di-
versification process that they have already begun, 49 and the ultimate
impact on the economy could thereby be held to a minimum.
Fourth, the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General recognized
that there were some beneficial aspects associated with cigarette smoking.
Cigarettes satisfy a certain psychogenic drive for sensuous pleasures.
The committee feared that if 70 million American smokers were suddenly
deprived of tobacco, many might satisfy this psychogenic drive in outlets
far less socially acceptable than cigarette smoking. Accordingly, the
Smoking Report expressly disavowed any intention to encourage legis-
lation that would outlaw smoking.80
Fifth, it is important to keep in mind exactly what we are trying to
achieve. Cigarettes are not to be classified as a scourge to mankind
that must be permanently eradicated. It is debatable whether the
Government would be morally justified in depriving the American con-
sumer of the opportunity to weigh the pleasure derived from smoking
against the risk incurred, and to decide for himself whether the risk is
one worth taking. We only require that the consumer be able to balance
these factors intelligently in order to arrive at a free and informed
decision.
To be successful, any solution must take account of these four goals
-avoidance of unnecessary congestion in the courts, an equitable dis-
tribution of the loss among tobacco manufacturers, a gradual readjust-
ment of the economy, and freedom of choice for the individual smoker.
Of course, no solution can afford to lose sight of the primary objec-
tive-curtailment of the health menace. Until a solution is found that
can achieve these objectives, the Surgeon General's call for "appropriate
remedial action" cannot be regarded as answered.
useful contribution is simply too remote to justify an absolute prohibition. (Note that this
is not limited to cigarettes-witness the much discussed link between dairy foods and
cholesterol level.)
348 For specific data, see note 210 supra and accompanying text.
349 See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
350 Smoking Report 355. See also the statement of Surgeon General Luther L. Terry,
testifying before the House Commerce Committee on behalf of labeling legislation. N.Y.
Times, April 10, 1965, p. 14, col. 3.
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APPENDIX
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
79 Stat. 282 (1965), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 1965).
§ 1331. Congressional declaration of policy and purpose.
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish
a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and ad-
vertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health,
whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each
package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not
impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and adver-
tising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health.
§ 1332. Definitions.
As used in this chapter-
(1) The term "cigarette" means (A) any roll of tobacco wrapped in
papek or in any substance not containing tobacco, and (B) any roll of
tobacco wrapped in any substance containing tobacco which, because of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and
labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette
described in subparagraph (A).
(2) the term "commerce" means (A) commerce between any State,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman
Reef, or Johnston Island any any place outside thereof; (B) commerce
between points in any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island,
Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, or Johnston Island, but through any
place outside therof; or (C) commerce wholly within the District of Colum-
bia, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway
Islands, Kingman Reef, or Johnston Island.
(3) The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, in-
dudes the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island,
Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, and Johnston Island.
(4) The term "package" means a pack, box, carton, or container of
any kind in which cigarettes are offered for sale, sold or otherwise dis-
tributed to consumers.
(5) The term "person" means an individual, partnership, corporation,
or any other business or legal entity.
(6) The term "sale or distribution" includes sampling or any other
distribution not for sale.
§ 1333. Labeling; requirement; conspicuous statement.
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or package for
sale or distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of
which fails to bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking
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May Be Hazardous to Your Health." Such statement shall be located in a
conspicuous place on every cigarette package and shall appear in conspicuous
and legible type in contrast by typography, layout, or color with other
printed matter on the package.
§ 1334. Preemption.
(a) Additional statements on packages.
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) Advertising statements.
No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the ad-
vertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Authority of Federal Trade Commission: unfair or deceptive advertis-
ing acts or practices; issuance of trade regulation rules; affirmative ad-
vertising statements.
Except as is otherwise provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit, restrict, expand, or other-
wise affect, the authority of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes, nor to
affirm or deny the Federal Trade Commission's holding that it has the au-
thority to issue trade regulation rules or to require an affirmative statement in
any cigarette advertisement.
(d) Reports to Congress; transmittal by Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare and Federal Trade Commission.
(1) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall transmit a
report to the Congress not later than eighteen months after January 1, 1966,
and annually thereafter, concerning (A) current information on the health
consequences of smoking and (B) such recommendations for legislation as
he may deem appropriate.
(2) The Federal Trade Commission shall transmit a report to the Con-
gress not later than eighteen months after January 1, 1966, and annually
thereafter, concerning (A) the effectiveness of cigarette labeling, (B) current
practices and methods of cigarette advertising and promotion, and (C) such
recommendations for legislation as it may deem appropriate.
§ 1335. Criminal penalty.
Any person who violates the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and shall on conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000.
§ 1336. Injunction proceedings.
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdic-
tion, for cause shown, to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter upon
the application of the Attorney General of the United States acting through
the several United States attorneys in their several districts.
§ 1337. Cigarettes for export.
Packages of cigarettes manufactured, imported, or packaged (1) for ex-
port from the United States or (2) for delivery to a vessel or aircraft, as
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supplies, for consumption beyond the jurisdiction of the internal revenue
laws of the United States shall be exempt from the requirements of this
chapter, but such exemptions shall not apply to cigarettes manufactured, im-
ported, or packaged for sale or distribution to members or units of the
Armed Forces of the United States located outside of the United States.
§ 1338. Separability of provisions.
If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person
or circumstances is held invalid, the other provisions of this chapter and the
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
§ 1339. Termination of provisions affecting regulation of advertising.
The provisions of this chapter which affect the regulation of advertising
shall terminate on July 1, 1969, but such termination shall not be construed
as limiting, expanding, or otherwise affecting the jurisdiction or authority
which the Federal Trade Commission or any other Federal agency had prior
to July 27, 1965.
